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Abstract of the Thesis
In the literature on contests, punishments have received much less attention than
prizes. One possible reason is that punishing the bottom player(s) in a contest
where all contestants are not allowed to quit, while e¤ective in increasing con-
testantstotal e¤ort, often violates individual rationality constraints. But what
will happen in an open contest where all potential contestants can choose whether
or not to participate? In chapter 1, we study a model of this type and allow
the contest designer to punish the bottom participant according to their perfor-
mances. We conclude that punishment is often not desirable (optimal punishment
is zero) when the contest designer wants to maximize the expected total e¤ort,
while punishment is often desirable (optimal punishment is strictly positive) when
the contest designer wants to maximize the expected highest individual e¤ort.
In the literature on imperfectly discriminating contests, researchers normally
assume that the contest designer has a certain level of accuracy in choosing the win-
ner, which can be represented by the discriminatory power r in the Power Contest
Success Function (the Power CSF, proposed by Tullock in 1980). With symmetric
contestants, it is well known that increasing accuracy (r) always increases total
e¤ort when the pure-strategy equilibrium exists. In chapter 2, we look at the cases
where the contestants are heterogeneous in ability. We construct an equilibrium
set on r > 0, where a unique pure-strategy equilibrium exists for any r below a
critical value and a mixed-strategy equilibrium exists for any r above this critical
value. We nd that if the contestants are su¢ ciently di¤erent in ability, there al-
ways exists an optimal accuracy level for the contest designer. Additionally, as we
increase the di¤erence in their abilities, the optimal accuracy level decreases. The
above conclusions provide an explanation to many phenomena in the real world
and may give guidance in some applications.
In chapter 3, we propose the Power Contest Defeat Function (the Power CDF)
5
which eliminates one player out at a time over successive rounds. We show that
the Power CDF has the same good qualities as the Power Contest Success Function
(the Power CSF) and is more realistic in some cases. We look at both the Power
CSF mechanism (selecting winners in sequence) and the Power CDF mechanism
(selecting losers in sequence) and show that punishments increase expected total
e¤orts signicantly. More interestingly, we also nd that when the contestants
e¤ort levels are di¤erent, the Power CDF mechanism is more accurate in nding
the correct winner (the one who makes the greatest e¤ort) and the Power CSF
mechanism is more accurate in nding the correct loser (the one who makes the
smallest e¤ort).
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Introduction to the Thesis
Theory of Contests
A contest is dened as a situation where contestants compete against each other
to win a prize or multiple prizes. In reality, many types of interaction (in which
players expend e¤ort in trying to get ahead of their rivals) have been studied in
the eld of contest theory both within these specic contexts and at a higher level
of abstraction. Such interactions include sports, rent-seeking for rents allocated by
a public regulator, political competition, patent races, litigation, relative reward
schemes in rms or schools, competition for jobs or promotions, and arm races,
military combat or war, etc.
Among the above practical examples which can be seen or studied as contests,
there are some conventional types of contests such as sports contests and tourna-
ment, but there are some situations which people normally do not take as contests
at rst sight, such as rent-seeking, arm races, war and litigation. Next, we try to
look at those situations from a certain angle. A part of economics (e.g., general
equilibrium) studies situations where property rights are dened clearly and agents
voluntarily trade rights over goods or produce rights for new goods. This approach
produce important insights into the role of markets in resource allocation such as
the existence and e¢ ciency of competitive equilibrium, the optimal specialization
under international trade, the role of prices in providing information to the agents,
etc. However, there are other situations where agents do not trade but rather ght
over property rights. In these situations, agents can inuence the outcome of the
process by means of certain actions such as investment in military power, bribing
judges or policy regulators, lobbying politicians, hiring lawyers, advertising, etc.
These situations can also be seen and studied as contests besides the conventional
types of contests.
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In theory, two main branches can be distinguished in the literature on con-
tests. Firstly, perfectly discriminating contests  e¤ort is perfectly observable,
the contestants make irreversible e¤orts and the one who makes the highest e¤ort
wins the prize for certain. Technically speaking, a perfectly discriminating con-
test is very similar to an all pay auction: the prize is like the object auctioned
and a contestants e¤ort is like his bid. Therefore, a lot of techniques of auction
theory can be applied to perfectly discriminating contests. Secondly, imperfectly
discriminating contests e¤ort is not perfectly observable, so the contestant who
expends the largest e¤ort may not win the prize, but the probability of a particu-
lar contestant winning is increasing in his e¤ort and decreasing in the e¤ort of his
opponents. A critical component of a contest in the literature on imperfectly dis-
criminating contests is the Contest Success Function (CSF), which provides each
players probability of winning for any given level of e¤ort.
The literature on contests has developed rapidly from the seminal papers by
Tullock (1967, 1980) which study rent-seeking. For example, in the literature on
perfectly discriminating contests, Hillman and Riley (1989) study a two-contestant
case and Baye, Kovenock and deVries (1996) look at the more than two-contestant
case and prove the equilibrium is unique, Baye, Kovenock and deVries (1998)
consider contests with a non-linear cost function, Che and Gale (1998) study a sit-
uation where contestants have constraints on e¤ort. All the above papers consider
cases with complete information. Perfectly discriminating contests with incomplete
information have also attracted considerable interest in the literature, a selection
of contributions are Glazer and Hassin (1988), Amann and Leininger (1996), Kr-
ishna and Morgan (1997), Baye, Kovenock and deVries (1998), Clark and Riis
(2000), Moldovanu and Sela (2001), Moldovanu, Sela and Shi (2008). While in
the literature on imperfectly discriminating contests, Hillman and Katz (1984),
Hillman and Samet (1987), Skaperdas and Gan (1995), Konrad and Schlesinger
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(1997) study cases with strict risk-averse contestants. Dixit (1987) analyses a
Stackelberg formulation in which one player is able to precommit. Perez-Catrillo
and Verdier (1992) explore the implications of a Contest Success Function (CSF)
where r is an exogenous discrimination factor, Blavatsky (2004) considers CSF
with the possibility of a draw. A large variety of di¤erent types of contests have
been studied. For example, rent-seeking by Tullock (1980), Hillman (1989) and
etc., conict and appropriation by Garnkel and Skaperdas (1996), R&D by Loury
(1979), patent races by Nti (1997), nonprice competition by Huck et al (2001), the
choice between lobbying and litigation by Rubin et al (2001), the periodic con-
tests to host prestigious events like the Olympic Games by Corchon (2000) and
Status games by Frank (1985), Frank and Cook (1995), multi-stage contests by Fu
and Lu (2007), persuasion (as in advertising, litigation and political campaigning,
etc) by Skaperdas and Vaidya (2007). The above is only a very small part of the
literature1.
Aims and Contributions
The focus of my Ph.D. thesis is on nding the optimal level of the contest de-
signers choice variable, such as punishment and accuracy level, to maximize the
contestants(expected) total e¤ort or highest individual e¤ort with heterogeneous
contestants.
In daily life, the expression carrots and sticksrefers to a policy of o¤ering a
combination of rewards and punishments to induce some desired behaviour. In the
literature on contests, the focus has been on the carrots allocating prizes to the
top players, with little attention paid to the sticks punishing the bottom players.
1The theory of contests is a vast literature and a dynamic eld, the interested reader can
consult the surveys of Nitzan (1994), Konrad (2007) and Corchon (2007) for a general review of
this literature.
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However, in practice punishing the bottom players can be observed in a variety of
circumstances. One important reason that punishments draw much less attention
than prizes in the literature is that it is trivial that adding punishments is e¤ective
in increasing e¤ort levels ignoring participation constraints. That is for a given
group of contestants who can not quit the contest, punishing the bottom player
who exerts the lowest e¤ort level, will increase the total e¤ort of the contestants
for certain. In this case, punishments should be made as large as possible from
the contest designers point of view. However, adding a punishment, especially
when the punishment is large, will often violate individual rationality constraints
a contestant may nd that his expected utility in equilibrium is negative. So
what would happen if we allow all contestants to freely choose whether or not
to participate? The rst chapter of this thesis attempts to take both prize and
punishment into account in the literature on perfectly discriminating contests. I
show that in an opencontest where all potential contestants can freely choose
whether or not to enter, it is optimal to set no punishment if the contest designer
wants to maximize the expected total e¤ort in most cases and it is optimal to set
an appropriate amount of punishment if the contest designer wants to maximize
the expected highest e¤ort in most cases. Intuitively, some low ability players
will drop out if a punishment is introduced, so the competition between the par-
ticipants is likely to become less erce from this perspective since fewer players
are involved. However, the competition between the participants is also likely to
become ercer since the participants want to avoid the punishment. The overall
e¤ect of introducing a (small) punishment is that the low ability players drop out,
the medium ability players make less e¤ort but the high ability players make more
e¤ort. This is the reason for the di¤erence between the two objectives.
In the Power CSF, the parameter r can be interpreted as the cognitive ability or
the accuracy level of the contest designer. The greater r is, the higher the cognitive
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ability the contest designer has and the more accurate the contest designer is. In
the previous literature on imperfectly discriminating contests, most researchers
take r as an exogenous variable. One important reason might be that researchers
focus on the symmetric case with symmetric contestants, the higher r is, the
greater the total e¤ort elicited from the contestants. Therefore, it is widely believed
that the contest designer always has an incentive to increase r, so from the contest
designers point of view, r has already been increased to the highest possible level.
In the second chapter, we focus on the contest designers accuracy level in choosing
the winner in an imperfectly discriminating contest. We look at a model where the
two contestants are heterogeneous in ability and construct an equilibrium set on
r > 0, where a unique pure-strategy equilibrium exists for any r below a critical
value and a mixed-strategy equilibrium exists for any r above this critical value.
We nd that if the contestants are su¢ ciently di¤erent in ability, there always
exists an optimal accuracy level for the contest designer. In these circumstances
to maximize total e¤ort, r should be set at the optimal accuracy level instead
of the highest possible level. Additionally, as we increase the di¤erence in their
abilities, the optimal accuracy level decreases. The above conclusions provide
an explanation to many phenomena in the real world and may give guidance in
some applications. For example, in recent years with the rapid development of
technologies, some people argue that it is time to introduce high-tech into the
sports (like tennis, football and basketball, etc) to make the games more accurate.
However, our model shows that there is a reason for not using replays and other
technologies, more accuracy may reduce e¤ort and therefore reduce skill levels.
The Power CSF has been much used to select the winner or multiple winners
in the literature on imperfectly discriminating contests. However, things become
more complicated in a technical way when the contest designer wants to iden-
tify the bottom players in order to punish them. This is because we need the
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whole rank of all contestants to identify the bottom players (i.e., the losers) in the
Power CSF mechanism. In the third chapter, we propose the Power Contest De-
feat Function (Power CDF) which eliminates one player at a time over successive
rounds. We show that the Power CDF has the same good qualities as the Power
CSF and is more realistic in some cases. For instance, suppose several cities are
in a competition to host the Olympic Games, one city will be eliminated in each
round until only one city remains, which is the winner. We look at both the Power
CSF mechanism (selecting winners in sequence) and the Power CDF mechanism
(selecting losers in sequence) and show that punishments increase expected total
e¤orts signicantly. More interestingly, we also nd that when the contestants
e¤ort levels are di¤erent, the Power CDF mechanism is more accurate in nding
the correct winner (the one who makes the greatest e¤ort) and the Power CSF
mechanism is more accurate in nding the correct loser (the one who makes the
smallest e¤ort). In other words, the multi-step mechanism provides more accuracy
in nding the correct winner or loser.
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1 Chapter 1: Punishment in an Open Contest
1.1 Introduction
In daily life, carrots and sticks refers to a policy of o¤ering a combination of
rewards and punishments to induce some desired behaviour. In the literature on
contests, focus has been on the carrots allocating prizes to the top players, with
little attention paid to the sticks punishing the bottom players. However, in prac-
tice punishing the bottom players can be observed in a variety of circumstances.
One important reason that punishments draw much less attention than prizes in
the literature could be that it is trivial that adding punishments is e¤ective in in-
creasing e¤ort levels ignoring participation constraints. That is for a given group
of contestants who can not quit the contest, punishing the bottom player who
exerts the lowest e¤ort level, will increase the total e¤ort of the contestants for
certain. In this case, punishments should be made as large as possible from the
contest designers point of view. However, adding a punishment, especially when
the punishment is large, will often violate the individual rationality constraints
 a contestant can nd that his expected utility in equilibrium is negative. So
what would happen if we allow all contestants to freely choose whether or not to
participate?
In this paper we assume there is no loss if contestants choose not to enter
the contest, so all players can freely choose whether or not to participate; we call
this type of contest an open contest. There are many practical examples of open
contests, such as a photo contest in which all photographers satisfying a certain
criterion can choose whether or not to participate; or an essay contest in which
students can choose whether or not to participate; or a contest for promotion
where all workers can choose to be entered or not, etc.
In the real world, the results of this paper provide the following insights: given
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an unchanged prize, if the contest designer wants to maximize the total e¤ort from
all potential players, no punishment should be set (on the worst performer among
all participants) in most cases. However, if the contest designer wants to get the
best work from the top contestant, a strictly positive punishment should be set in
most cases. Intuitively, introducing a punishment will have two e¤ects. Firstly,
the selection e¤ect: some players will drop out (the low ability players), and the
competition between the participants will become less erce since fewer players
are involved, consequently, some participants will make less e¤ort (the medium
ability players). Secondly, the incentive e¤ect: some participants (the high ability
players) will make more e¤ort to avoid the punishment. These two e¤ects occur
at the same time. Therefore, by introducing a punishment, the low ability players
drop out and the medium ability players make less e¤ort, while only the high
ability players make more e¤ort. This is the reason for the di¤erence between the
two objectives punishment is often not desirable when the contest designer wants
to maximize the expected total e¤ort, while punishment is often desirable when
the contest designer wants to maximize the expected highest individual e¤ort.
According to the conclusion of our model, fewer players will participate if the
contest designer increases the magnitude of punishment. This result points out
one important cost of adding punishment decreasing the number of participants.
We believe that this form of cost, at least in a long run, is the major cost of
adding punishment in a contest. For example, suppose the Economics School (at
a university) announces that, from the next semester, half of the students will
be failed at the end of each semester according to their exam results. One can
be certain that the current students who are studying economics will work much
harder since no one wants to be failed. However, in the long run, fewer students
would choose to study economics because of the high probability of failure.
In a seminal paper of a large literature on tournaments, Lazear and Rosen
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(1981) argue that rank-order tournaments help to solve a moral hazard problem
faced by rms. This paper and the following papers have shown that rewarding
players based on their work performances provides e¤ective incentives in labor
tournaments. Akerlof and Holden (2007) extend the analysis of Lazear and Rosen
(1981) to the case with multiple prizes and show that it is generally optimal to
give rewards to top performers that are smaller in magnitude than corresponding
punishments to poor performers. Their model assumes that all players are homo-
geneous in abilities and e¤ort and performance is stochastically related which is
the main di¤erence between their works and ours.
The two papers most closely related to the present paper are Moldovanu and
Sela (2001) and Moldovanu, Sela and Shi (2008). The rst seeks to explain prize
structures in tournaments within the framework of private value all-pay auctions.
The model we use in this paper is based on that in Moldovanu and Sela (2001)
with xed rst prize and linear cost functions  the main di¤erence being that
we allow the possibility of punishing the bottom participant in a contest where all
potential players can freely choose whether or not to enter, with no cost incurred if
they stay out of the contest. In one section of Moldovanu, Sela and Shi (2008), the
case where contestants can exit the contest without cost is analyzed, this is very
similar to what we analyze in this paper2. Interestingly, one important conclusion
of this paper seems to contradict the corresponding result in Moldovanu, Sela and
Shi (2008), where they nd that when the contest designer wants to maximize the
expected total e¤ort, punishment is always optimal.3 We will discuss the di¤erence
and the reasons for it later.
Minimum-e¤ort requirement (or entry fee) can also be used to exclude low-
2The original version of this paper was produced and circulated in 2007, independently of
Moldovanu, Sela and Shi (2008).
3In this paper, we also look at a case where the contest designer wants to maximize the
expected highest individual e¤ort, which Moldovanu, Sela and Shi (2008) did not cover.
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ability players from the contest. Here, we want to emphasize the di¤erence be-
tween minimum-e¤ort requirement and punishment. Firstly, with minimum-e¤ort
requirement, all participants have to make at least a certain amount of e¤ort to
enter the contest, while in our model only the participant with the lowest e¤ort
will be punished by su¤ering a loss. Secondly, it has been proved that with linear
cost functions, a contest with a single rst prize and an (optimally set) entry fee
(i.e., minimum-e¤ort requirement) is total e¤ort maximizing among all feasible
mechanisms (that are incentive compatible and individual rational)4, while in this
paper we nd that punishment is often not desirable to maximize total e¤ort.
1.2 The Model
There are k  3 potential players in a contest with a xed rst prize V > 0. 5 All
potential players can freely choose whether or not to participate in this contest.
Among all contestants who participate in the contest, the player with the highest
e¤ort will win the prize, and the player with the lowest e¤ort will be punished
by bearing a loss p, where p 2 [0; V ] which is a choice variable of the contest
designer.6
Each player, say contestant i simultaneously makes the participation decision
and chooses an e¤ort level xi if he participates without knowing the decision of
others. Take an essay contest for example: the students who have to submit their
essays by the deadline do not know the number of participants until after the
4See Riley and William F. Samuelson (1981) for details.
5We assume the prize is simply xed, i.e., it is indivisible. Moldovanu and Sela (2001) prove
that, with linear cost functions, if the contest designer can award several prizes (without pun-
ishment), it is optimal to allocate the entire prize sum to a single rst prize to maximize the
expected total e¤ort. This is a reason why we consider single prize in our model.
6Note here we assume if only one person participates in the contest, then he will get the prize
and the punishment at the same time.
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deadline. An e¤ort xi causes player i a disutility denoted by cixi, where ci refers
to contestant is (constant) marginal cost of e¤ort, which is private information to
himself. ci is also called the ability parameter of contestant i, a low ci indicates
high ability and vice versa. Ability parameters are drawn independently of each
other on the interval [s; s] (where s > s > 0) according to a distribution function F
that is common knowledge. We assume that F has a continuous density function
f = dF=dc > 0.
Each contestant chooses his e¤ort level in order to maximize his expected utility
given the values of the prize and the punishment. The contest designer determines
the size of the punishment in order to maximize the expected value of the sum of
the e¤orts (i.e.
Pk
i=1 xi) or the expected value of the highest individual e¤ort.
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Notice that in this model we allow the possibility of punishing the bottom
participant in a contest where all potential players can opt not to enter at no
cost. Because of the existence of punishment, we have to consider contestants
participation constraints  each players expected utility in equilibrium is non-
negative, an issue that did not arise in Moldovanu and Sela (2001) since without
punishment, every contestants expected utility is always non-negative.
1.2.1 The Objective Function and Entry Decision
Given the commonly known values of the prize V and punishment p, to any con-
testant who decides to participate in this contest, a contestant with the ability
parameter c, solves the following problem by choosing e¤ort level x:
Max
x
fV  Pr(x is the highest)  p Pr(x is the lowest)  cxg:
Assume there is an equilibrium such that only contestants with c 2 [s; e) partici-
pate in the contest and each contestant makes e¤ort according to a strictly decreas-
7We assume that the contest designer only focuses on e¤ort levels and he dose not get any
material benet directly from the prize or the punishment.
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ing di¤erentiable symmetric equilibrium e¤ort function x = b(c) when c 2 [s; e).
All contestants with c 2 [e; s] do not participate in the contest; in other words,
they make zero e¤ort and their expected utility is zero.
The contestant with c = e will just be indi¤erent between participating in the
contest or not. In both situations, he will make zero e¤ort, i.e., b(e) = 0 when
he enters. By the assumption of the equilibrium e¤ort function, he has the lowest
e¤ort of any entrant, there is no point in him putting in a positive e¤ort as he
will lose against all other entrants with probability one. He wants to enter the
contest with zero e¤ort (which guarantees being punished with probability one)
because there is a chance he is the only entrant, in that case, he wins the prize.
The marginal contestants expected utility is8:
V  Pr(e¤ort is the highest)  p Pr(e¤ort is the lowest)  e 0 = 0
) F (e) = 1  (p=V )
1
k 1 : (1)
By looking at the marginal player (the contestant who is just indi¤erent about
entering9) whose ability parameter c = e where e satises (1), we can see that the
larger p is, the smaller F (e) is, and so the smaller e is, i.e., fewer players would
participate in the contest. We can see if the contest designer sets the punishment
to the same value as the prize, according to (1),
1  F (e) = 1) F (e) = 0) e = s;
which means no player will participate in this contest, so total e¤ort is always zero.
Intuitively, this is because if it was not true, with the value of the punishment being
8Recall we assume if there is only one contestant who participates in this contest, he simul-
taneously gets the punishment and the prize.
9In the equilibrium, all players with c  e are indi¤erent about entering. We make them not
participate in our equilibrium. This may seem somewhat arbitrary. But adding a very small
miminum e¤ort if a player participates would make higher cost agents (c  e) strictly prefer to
not participate.
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equal to the value of the prize (p = V ), by collecting the punishment from the
bottom player and awarding it to the top player, the contest designer can get a
positive total e¤ort for free! Therefore, only when p < V , do potential entrants
exist and make positive e¤ort.
Because we assume b(c) is strictly decreasing in c, this implies that if one
contestants ability parameter is c, the probability of one other contestants ability
parameter being smaller than c is F (c).
x = b(c)) c = b 1(x),
which means in equilibrium if a participant makes an e¤ort x, by the equilibrium
e¤ort function, we can infer his ability by c = b 1(x). Then, given the equilibrium




fV  [1  F (b 1(x))]k 1| {z }
Pr(x is the highest)
  p [F (b 1(x)) + 1  F (e)]k 1| {z }
Pr(x is the lowest)
 cxg (2)
where [1   F (b 1(x))]k 1 refers to the probability that all other potential con-
testants make less e¤ort than x and [F (b 1(x)) + (1   F (e))]k 1 refers to the
probability that all other contestants either make more e¤ort than x or do not
participate in the contest.
1.2.2 The Equilibrium
In Appendix 1A, we prove the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Given V and p 2 [0; V ], there exists a symmetric equilibrium:
all players with c 2 [e; s] do not participate in the contest; while all players with
c 2 [s; e) participate in the contest and make e¤ort according to the following
bidding function:





fV [1  F (t)]k 2 + p[F (t) + 1  F (e)]k 2gf(t)dt; (3)
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where e satises (1):
We can split the equilibrium e¤ort function into two parts:
b(c) = V A(c) + pB(c);
where











[F (t) + 1  F (e)]k 2f(t)dt:
So then
A0(c) =  (k   1)1
c
[1  F (c)]k 2f(c) < 0;
B0(c) =  (k   1)1
c
[F (c) + 1  F (e)]k 2f(c) < 0:
Therefore
b0(c) = V A0(c) + pB0(c) < 0: (4)
Thus, b(c) is strictly decreasing and di¤erentiable when c 2 [s; e), which is consis-
tent with what we assumed initially. This means the lower the ability parameter
is (i.e., the more able the participant is), the more e¤ort the participant is going
to make in equilibrium.
1.2.3 Two E¤ects of Introducing a small Punishment
From (4), we can derive
b0(c) =  (k   1)f(c)
c
fV [1  F (c)]k 2 + p[F (c) + 1  F (e)]k 2g: (5)
We start a situation with no punishment,






V [1  F (c)]k 2:
When a punishment p > 0 is introduced, then
(5)) b0(c)jp>0 = b0(c)jp=0  
(k   1)f(c)
c
p[F (c) + 1  F (e)]k 2 (6)
Thus for every c 2 [s; e),
b0(c)jp>0 < b0(c)jp=0: (7)
By using (7), we derive the following proposition in Appendix 1A.
Proposition 2 For two equilibrium e¤ort functions b(c)jp>0 (with a positive pun-
ishment) and b(c)jp=0 (with no punishment): (a) b(c)jp>0 is always steeper than
b(c)jp=0. (b) b(c)jp>0 and b(c)jp=0 at most cross once. If they cross at point c = c,
then b(c)jp>0 > b(c)jp=0 for c < c and b(c)jp>0 < b(c)jp=0 for c > c. If they do
not cross, then b(c)jp>0 < b(c)jp=0 for all c.
Part (a) shows that when a punishment is introduced, the competition between
participants will become relatively more erce. Part (b) indicates that in an open
contest without punishment, if the contest designer introduces a small punishment,
b(c)jp>0 and b(c)jp=0 cross at point c = c, then the players with c 2 [s; c) whom
we call the high ability players, will make more e¤ort; the players with c 2 (c; e]
whom we call the medium ability players10, will make less e¤ort; and the players
with c 2 [e; s] whom we call the low ability players, will drop out (see Figure 1.1).
Intuitively, introducing a small punishment has two main e¤ects. Firstly, the
selection e¤ect: by adding a punishment, some players (the low ability players) will
drop out, i.e., they decide not to participate. So there are fewer players involved,
from this point of view, the competition between the participants will become less
10Notice that without punishment, all players with c 2 [s; s] participate in the contest, while
when a small punishment is introduced, only players with c 2 [s; e) enter.
21
erce. This will cause some players (the medium players) to make less e¤ort since
it is easier to outbid the low ability players. Secondly, the incentive e¤ect: by
adding a punishment, some players (the high ability players) will make more e¤ort
to avoid the punishment. The reasons are, rstly, it costs them less compared
with other players by putting in the same amount of extra e¤ort; secondly, each
of them will make more e¤ort given that other high ability players making more
e¤ort. From this point of view, the competition among the high ability players
will become more erce.
However, when the punishment is too large, all participants will make less
e¤ort than before since too many players drop out in this situation (i.e., b(c)jp>0 <
b(c)jp=0 for all c, see Figure 1.2). Therefore, to maximize either the expected











S e S c
Figure 1.2
Figure 1.1 and Figure 1.2 describe the equilibrium e¤ort functions where b1(c)
with p = 0 and b2(c) with p > 0.11 In Figure 1.1, we can see that with the
introduction of a small punishment, the high ability players who have c 2 [s; c)
will make higher e¤ort, the medium ability players who have c 2 (c; e) will make
less e¤ort and the low ability players who have c 2 (e; s] will drop out. However,
in Figure 1.2, we see that when a large punishment is introduced, all participants
make less e¤ort than before.
1.2.4 Two Objectives of the Contest Designer
Maximizing Expected Total E¤ort In this section, it is assumed that the
contest designers aim is to maximize the expected total e¤ort. Take an essay
contest as an example: say a university wants to set an essay contest in some
specic eld to improve the overall academic level of all students in that eld, so
it wants all the students to contribute as much as possible, i.e., maximize the total
e¤ort.
In the equilibrium we characterize, from the contest designers point of view,
11Note that p is small/large compared with V in Figure 1.1/Figure 1.2.
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We have shown that the equilibrium e¤ort function x = b(c) is strictly decreasing
for participants with c 2 [s; e), and from the contest designers point of view,
b(c) = 0 for all contestants with c  e who stay out of this contest. There are k
potential contestants, so the expected total e¤ort (TE) is









fV [1  F (t)]k 2 + p[F (t) + 1  F (e)]k 2gf(t)dtf(c)dc: (10)
We can see that maximizing TE is equivalent to maximizing R1. In Appendix 1A,
we prove the following proposition by analyzing (10):
Proposition 3 In an open contest, if the density function f(c) is non-decreasing12
with c on the interval [s; s], then it is always optimal to set p = 0 in order to
maximize the expected total e¤ort.
When f(c) is non-decreasing (i.e., increasing or staying constant) with c, in-
tuitively, the contest designer expects it is very likely that there are only a few
high ability players (c 2 [s; c)) and the majority of the potential players are the
low ability players (c 2 (e; s]) and the medium players (c 2 (c; e)). Therefore,
adding a punishment, which will make the low ability players drop out and medium
players make less e¤ort, will always decrease the expected total e¤ort.
When f(c) is decreasing with c on the interval [s; s], to maximize the expected
total e¤ort, the optimal punishment can still be zero (see Case 2 in Appendix 1B for
12In this section, we focus on monotone density functions because it is di¢ cult to derive any
general conclusions with non-monotone density functions.
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an example) or strictly positive (see Case 3 in Appendix 1B for an example). Why
is it possible that the optimal punishment can be strictly positive with decreasing
density function? It is because the contest designer expects it is very likely to
have a lot of high ability players who will make more e¤ort with the introduction
of a punishment, so he will put more weight on the high ability players when he
maximizes the total e¤ort, which makes it possible to make punishment desirable
in this case.
The above result is consistent with what we observe in the real world quite
often  in most open contests there is no punishment. Therefore in our essay
contest example, the university should announce the student with the top quality
essay will be allocated with a prize and no one will be punished at all due to their
poor quality essays.
In one section of Moldovanu, Sela and Shi (2008), a very similar situation
has been analyzed  they prove that the optimal punishment is always strictly
positive when the contest designer wants to maximize the expected total e¤ort.
This contradicts our corresponding result: when f(c) is non-decreasing in c, the
optimal punishment is always zero and even when f(c) is decreasing in c, the
optimal punishment can still be zero (see Case 2 in Appendix 1B for an example).
Next we analyze and discuss this di¤erence.
The main di¤erence between our model (which follows Moldovanu and Sela
(2001)) and Moldovanu, Sela and Shi (2008) is on the distribution of the marginal
cost of e¤ort. The marginal cost of e¤ort in our model (i.e., the ability parame-
ter c), is replaced with 1=a in theirs where a is distributed on the interval [0; 1]
according to a distribution function  that is common knowledge which has a
continuous density function  = d=da > 0. Since in their model a is distributed
on the interval [0; 1], the marginal cost of e¤ort 1=a is distributed on the interval
[1;+1). Because they assume  > 0; the density function in terms of 1=a must be
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always positive on the interval [1;+1). Therefore, the real di¤erence between our
model and theirs is that the marginal cost of e¤ort (represented by c in our model
and 1=a in theirs) is distributed on [s; s] in our model and [1;+1) in theirs.
Theoretically, if we set s = 1 and s ! +1, our model will be the same
as the one in Moldovanu, Sela and Shi (2008). In Case 1 in Appendix 1B, we
look at the case where s ! +1 and we derive the same result as theirs  the
optimal punishment is strictly positive. However, this result does not contradict
our conclusion. It is because in this paper we asserts that the optimal punishment
is always zero when f(c) is non-decreasing with c on the interval [s; s], while when
s ! +1, the density function can not be always non-decreasing f(c) must be




Therefore, their conclusion is based on the case where the marginal cost of ef-
fort is distributed on [1;+1) with density function being always strictly positive.
Intuitively, this assumption always allows a possibility that a group of very low
ability players exists (1=a ! +1 as a ! 0), so starting from a situation with-
out punishment, introducing an appropriate punishment will make these very low
ability players drop out and the high ability players make more e¤ort. Because
these very low ability players only make little e¤ort in the situation without any
punishment, the selection e¤ect is smaller than the incentive e¤ect, therefore, the
expected total e¤ort must increase after the introduction of the punishment. This
is why the optimal punishment is always strictly positive in their model. However,
we argue that Moldovanu, Sela and Shi (2008) analyze a limiting case of our model
that is when s = 1 and s! +1. In this sense our model is more general.
Maximizing Expected Highest Individual E¤ort Instead of maximizing
the expected total e¤ort, in some cases the contest designer may only want to
elicit the highest individual e¤ort, i.e., the best work from all of the potential
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contestants. For example, for some reason a university may only need the best
essay from its students, with all essays of a lesser quality than the best being of no
interest to the university. In this section, we focus on the case when the contest
designer wants to maximize the expected highest individual e¤ort.
Rank the contestantsability parameter as follows: c1 < c2 < ::: < ck, so c1 is
the most able player. First consider G1(c), which is the distribution function of
c1. The probability that all k potential playersability parameters are bigger than
c, i.e., all potential players are less able than type c, is
(1  F (c))k,
then the probability that at least one contestant is more able than c is
1  (1  F (c))k.
Therefore,
G1(c) = Pr(c1 < c) = 1  (1  F (c))k,
hence, the probability density function of c1 is
g1(c) = G
0
1(c) = k(1  F (c))k 1f(c).













fV [1  F (t)]k 2 + p[F (t) + 1  F (e)]k 2gf(t)(1  F (c))k 1f(c)dtdc:
(11)
We can see that maximizing E[b(c1)] is equivalent to maximizing R2. In Appendix
1A, we prove the following proposition by analyzing (11):
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Proposition 4 In an open contest with k players, there always exists a number
of contestants k such that for k > k, for any form of the distribution density
function f(c), the optimal punishment is always strictly positive when the contest
designers aim is to maximize the expected highest individual e¤ort.
We have a relatively strong condition in Proposition 3: k must be large enough
(k > k) to guarantee the optimal punishment being strictly positive. This is
because we allow the density function f(c) to take any form. In fact, for many
forms of f(c), we can relax this restriction on k. For example, in Appendix 1A,
we also prove the following proposition:
Proposition 5 In an open contest where abilities are drawn from a uniform dis-
tribution on [s; s], i.e., f(c) = 1=(s   s), when s=s  1:47, for any k  3 it is
always optimal to set a strictly positive punishment if the contest designers aim
is to maximize the expected highest individual e¤ort.
Note that when s=s < 1:47, the optimal punishment can be zero or positive.
We want to emphasize that s=s  1:47 refers to the case when the highest possible
able player is at least 1:47 times as e¢ cient as the least possible able player, which
covers most common cases in reality. Therefore, when abilities are drawn from
a uniform distribution on [s; s], the optimal punishment is zero when the contest
designer wants to maximize the expected total e¤ort, while as long as s=s  1:47,
the optimal punishment is strictly positive when the contest designer wants to
maximize the expected highest individual e¤ort.
When the contest designer only wants to maximize the expected highest indi-
vidual e¤ort, there is a good chance that the most able player, type c1, is more
able than type c, i.e., c1 < c, so the contest designer will put more weight on
the high ability players. More intuitively, when we are maximizing the expected
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highest individual e¤ort, the contest designer cares about the high ability play-
ers much more than other players because the top player of this contest is the
one who has the highest ability. Introducing a punishment will increase the high
ability playerse¤ort which is very likely to increase the highest individual e¤ort.
That is why the contest designer often has an incentive to set a strictly positive
amount of punishment to maximize the expected highest individual e¤ort.
Therefore, in our essay contest example, when the university only wants to
get the best essay, the university should set a strictly positive punishment in the
contest, i.e., it should announce that the participant whose essay is considered to
be the best will get a prize, while the participant whose essay is considered to be
the worst will be punished in some way.
1.3 Concluding Comments
We study an open contest where all potential contestants (who have private in-
formation about their abilities) can choose whether or not to enter and allow
the contest designer to punish the bottom participant according to their perfor-
mance. We conclude that punishment is often not desirable (optimal punishment
is zero) when the contest designer wants to maximize the expected total e¤ort,
while punishment is often desirable (optimal punishment is strictly positive) when
the contest designer wants to maximize the expected highest individual e¤ort, i.e.,
when the contest designer only cares about the performance of the top contestant.
In many circumstances there is a trade-o¤ between maximizing the expected total
e¤ort and maximizing the expected highest individual e¤ort. Hence, depending on




Proof of Proposition 1











(k 1)f(b 1(x))fV [1 F (b 1(x))]k 2+p[F (b 1(x))+1 F (e)]k 2g.
(12)
In equilibrium,















(k   1)fV [1  F (c)]k 2   p[F (c) + 1  F (e)]k 2gf(c).
Given the boundary condition: b(e) = 0, we derive





dt = V A(c) + pB(c)
where











[F (t) + 1  F (e)]k 2f(t)dt:
In the main text, we have shown that
b0(c) = V A0(c) + pB0(c) < 0:
Therefore, as we assumed, b(c) is strictly decreasing and di¤erentiable when c 2 [s;
e). Assuming except contestant i, all other players with c 2 [s; e) make e¤ort
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according to b(c), we need to show that for any type c of contestant i, the e¤ort b(c)
maximizes the expected utility of that type. The necessary rst order condition is
clearly satised since this is how we assumed b(c) to start with. Let
(x; c) = V [1  F (b 1(x))]k 1   p[F (b 1(x)) + 1  F (e)]k 1   cx
be the expected utility of player i with type c that makes e¤ort x. We will show
that the derivative x(x; c) is nonnegative if x is smaller than b(c) and nonpositive
if x is larger than b(c). As (x; c) is continuous in x, this implies that (x; c) is
maximized at x = b(c). Note that
x(x; c) =  (k   1)f(b 1(x))
db 1(x)
dx
fV [1  F (b 1(x))]k 2
+p[F (b 1(x)) + 1  F (e)]k 2g   c:
Let x < b(c), and let bc be the type who is supposed to bid x, that is b(bc) = x < b(c):
Note that bc > c because b is strictly decreasing. Di¤erentiating x(x; c) with
respect to c yields xc(x; c) =  1 < 0. That is, the function x(x; :) is decreasing
in c. Since bc > c, we obtain x(x; c)  x(x;bc).
Since x = b(bc) we obtain x(x;bc) = 0 by the rst-order condition, and therefore
that x(x; c)  0 for every x < b(c). A similar argument shows that x(x; c)  0
for every x > b(c).
Proof of Proposition 2
Because b0(c) < 0 and b0(c)jp>0 < b0(c)jp=0, it follows that (a) b(c)jp>0 is always
steeper than b(c)jp=0. To prove (b), suppose that b0(c)jp>0 and b0(c)jp=0 cross more





2. Then there must exist a point c
m 2 (c1; c2) where at point cm, the two
equilibrium e¤ort functions have the same slope, i.e., b0(cm)jp>0 = b0(cm)jp=0, which
contradicts (7). Therefore, b(c)jp>0 and b(c)jp=0 can not cross more than once. If
31
they cross once at point c, b0(c)jp>0 < b0(c)jp=0 < 0, so b(c)jp>0 > b(c)jp=0 for c < c
and b(c)jp>0 < b(c)jp=0 for c > c. If they do not cross, since b0(c)jp>0 < b0(c)jp=0
and b(e)jp>0 = 0, b(e)jp=0 > 0, it is trivial to see that b(c)jp>0 < b(c)jp=0 for all c.



























































































Our aim is to prove that when f(x) is non-decreasing in x,
dR1
dp
< 0 for 0  p < 1,
thus the optimal punishment is zero.





(k   1)f(e)(1  F (e))k 2V : (17)
Substituting (16) and (17) into (), we can derive
() =   1
(k   1)e [2  F (e)]F (e): (18)
In (), in a two-dimensional world, the area where c  t  e and s  c  e can














[F (t) + 1  F (e)]k 2f(t)dt: (19)
Because f is non-decreasing, we can infer that f 0(t)  0. Let
g(t) = F (t)=t, h(t) = tf(t)  F (t)





























[F (t) + (1  F (e))]k 2f(t)dt
=
F (e)
e(k   1)[1  (1  F (e))
k 1]  F (e)





e(k   1) . (21)






[F (t) + (1  F (e))]k 3f(t)f(c)dtdc < F (e)
e(k   2) . (22)
Substituting (16), (17) and (22) into (), we derive
() <
F (e)(1  F (e))
(k   1)e : (23)
From (18), (21) and (23), we obtain
dR1
dp
= () + () + () <  (2  F (e))F (e)
(k   1)e +
F (e)
(k   1)e +
F (e)(1  F (e))
(k   1)e = 0:
Therefore, when f(x) is non-decreasing in x, dR1=dp < 0 for all p 2 [0; 1).




























































)[(1  F (e))k 2 + p]f(e)
Z e
s




















[F (t) + 1  F (e)]k 3f(t)(1  F (c))k 1f(c)dtdc| {z }
(c)
:
Substituting (16) and (17) into (a) and (c), we can derive












[F (t) + 1  F (e)]k 3f(t)(1  F (c))k 1f(c)dtdc:
When p = 0, e = s and F (e) = F (s) = 1, we derive
dR2
dp








F (t)k 2f(t)(1  F (c))k 1f(c)dtdc  1
k(k   1)s:






F (t)k 2f(t)(1  F (c))k 1f(c)dtdc > 1
k(k   1)s: (24)
In a two-dimensional world, the area where c  t  s and s  c  s is equivalent
to the area where s  c  t and s  t  s, so mathematically we derive:
















F (t)k 2f(t)[1  (1  F (t))k]dt:
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[1  (1  F (t))k]F (t)k 2f(t)dt > 1
s(k   1) : (25)
Because we can derive
RHS of (25) =
1


































(1  F (t))k 1
t
F (t)k 2f(t)dt > 0: (26)




)  (1  F (t))k ]1
t
F (t)k
 2f(t)dt = 0: (27)





F (t)k 2f(t) and (1   F (t))k 1
t
F (t)k 2f(t), it can be seen
that, for all k where k > k, when k gets larger, (1  t
s
) becomes larger compared





F (t)k 2f(t) becomes relatively larger compared with
(1  F (t))k 1
t
F (t)k 2f(t). Therefore, when k > k, (26) always holds.















F (t)k 2f(t)(1  F (c))k 1f(c)dtdc  1
k(k   1)s > 0
) dR2
dp
jp=0 = (a) + (b) + (c) > 0
13Note here we assume k 2 R, while k 2 N .
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Proof of Proposition 5
Substituting F (t) =
t  s
s  s and f(t) =
1











(s  t)k 2 + p
t
(t  s+ s  e)k 2(s  c)k 1dt| {z }]
Y
dc:




















































)[(s  e)k 2 + p(s  s)k 2]
Z e
s




















(t+ s  s  e)k 3(s  c)k 1dtdc| {z }
(c1)
g:
Using (1) and F (e) =
e  s









(k   1)(s  e)k 2V (29)
Substituting (28) and (29) into (a1) and (c1), we have
(a1) =  















(t+ s  s  e)k 3(s  c)k 1dtdc:





































(t  s)k 2(s  c)k 1dtdc  (s  s)
2k 1
k(k   1)s g:






(t  s)k 2(s  c)k 1dtdc > (s  s)
2k 1
k(k   1)s : (30)
So the optimal punishment is strictly positive when (30) holds. In a two-dimensional
world, the area where c  t  s and s  c  s is equivalent to the area where
s  c  t and s  t  s, so mathematically we derive















(t  s)k 2[(s  s)k   (s  t)k]dt:
Let v =
s  t
s  s , then t = s  (s  s)v, so dt =  (s  s)dv; since s  t  s, we can
derive
0  s  t
s  s  1;
i.e., 0  v  1. Notice that v = 1 when t = s and v = 0 when t = s. Then we
write














s  v(s  s) dv:
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We claim that for all k  3, (30) holds ifZ 1
0
(1  v)k 2f (1  v
3)
1  v(1  (s=s))   1gdv > 0: (31)





(1  v)k 2f (1  v
3)




(1  v)k 2f (1  v
3)







(1  v)k 2f (1  v
k)
s  v(s  s)  
1
s
























s  v(s  s) dv 
(s  s)2k 1




1  (1  (s=s))v   1,
then the LHS of (31) becomesZ 1
0
(1  v)k 2j(v)dv. (32)
We can see that the sign of (1   v)k 2j(v) is determined by j(v) as 0  v  1.
According to the denition of integration, graphically, the value of (32) is equal to
the area between the v axis and the curve (1  v)k 2j(v) on the interval [0; 1]. By















As k increases in (31), more relative weight is put on j(v) for lower values of v,
and as j(v) crosses the axis only once (when v =
p
1  (s=s)), a positive integral
cannot become negative. Therefore, we conclude that ifZ 1
0
(1  v)k 2j(v)dvjk=3 > 0,
then for all k  3 Z 1
0
(1  v)k 2j(v)dv > 0.





(1  v)f (1  v
3)
1  [1  (s=s)]v   1gdv
= (1=12)[(s=s)  1] 5f 3 + 28(s=s)  30(s=s)2   6(s=s)3 + 17(s=s)4
 6(s=s)5 + 36(s=s)2 ln(s=s)  36(s=s)3 ln(s=s) + 12(s=s)4 ln(s=s)g:
By analyzing the above equation, it is easy to check when 0 < (s=s)  0:68, in
other words, when (s=s)  1:47,Z 1
0
(1  v)k 2j(v)dvjk=3 > 0;
so when (s=s)  1:47, Z 1
0
(1  v)k 2j(v)dv > 0 for k  3:
Thus, the optimal punishment is strictly positive in these cases. To sum up, the
logic of the whole proof is that:Z 1
0




















(s  s)2k 1f(a1) + (b1) + (c1)g > 0:
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1.5 Appendix 1B
Case 1 (Proposition 6 of Moldovanu, Sela and Shi, 2008) Let the support of F is



















[F (t)]k 1dF (t) > 0:
Therefore, the optimal punishment is strictly positive when s! +1.
Case 2 Let V = 1, k = 3, s = 1, s = 2, F (c) =  c2 + 4c  3 and f(c) = F 0(c) =
4 2c. We can see the density function is strictly decreasing with c on the interval








f(t  2)2 + p[4t  t2   3 + (e  2)2]g(4  2t)(4  2c)dtdc: (33)
Substituting F (e) =  e2 + 4e  3 into (1), we derive
e = 2  p 14 : (34)
Substituting (34) into (33), we write
dTE=dp =  172:4 49p 34 12p 3:6p 54+108(2 p 12 ) ln(2 p 14 )+45=(2 p 14 )+96p 14+96p 12 :
It is easy to show that dTE=dp < 0 for all p 2 [0; 1). Thus, the optimal punishment
can still be zero when the density function decreases in c.
Case 3 Let V = 1, k = 3, s = 1, s = 11, F (c) =  0:01c2 + 0:22c   0:21 and
f(c) = F 0(c) = 0:22  0:02c. We can see the density function is strictly decreasing












Substituting F (e) =  0:01e2 + 0:22e  0:21 into (1), we derive
e = 11  10p 14 : (36)
Substituting (36) into (35), we can express TE as a function of p: It can be found
that TE is maximized when p = 0:011. Thus, the optimal punishment can be
strictly positive when the density function decreases in c.
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2 Chapter 2: The Optimal Accuracy level in
Asymmetric Contests
2.1 Introduction
The International Table Tennis Federation (ITTF) changed the points scoring
system for international matches from rst to 21 to rst to 11 in 2000. One reason
for doing this is to reduce the accuracy level of the matches. The rationale for
this is simple. The domination of China meant that there was little incentive for
the other teams. Reducing the accuracy level increases the chance that a team
other than China will win, thus inducing more e¤ort from the other teams. This
increased competition could in turn result in greater e¤ort from the Chinese team.
The greater all round e¤ort in preparing for matches results in higher quality
and more entertaining matches. However, with very little accuracy there is also
little incentive for e¤ort. In the extreme case we simply have a lottery where the
probability of winning is independent of e¤ort. We investigate the optimal level
of accuracy in the face of these trade-o¤s.
A contest is a situation in which players compete against each other by making
irreversible e¤ort, often for a prize or multiple prizes14. In theory, two branches
can be distinguished in the literature. Firstly, perfectly discriminating contests
(very similar to rst-prize all-pay auctions) the e¤ort is perfectly observable, the
contestants make irreversible e¤orts and the player who makes the highest e¤ort
wins the prize for certain. Secondly, imperfectly discriminating contests  the
e¤ort is not perfectly observable, so the contestant who expends the largest e¤ort
14Typical examples are various types of rentseeking contests: competition among rms to win
a monopoly rent allocated by a public regulator, litigation, beauty contests, patent races, research
and development (R&D), political competition, competition to higher ranks, competition for jobs
or promotions, arm races and sports events, etc.
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may not win the prize, but the probability of a particular contestant winning is
increasing in his e¤ort and decreasing in the e¤ort of his opponents. A critical
component of a contest in the literature on imperfectly discriminating contests is
the Contest Success Function (CSF), which provides each players probability of
winning for any given level of e¤ort. In this paper, we use the Power CSF which






if maxfe1; :::eng > 0; (37)
pi(e) = 1=n otherwise,
where e = (e1; e2; :::; :en) denotes a vector of e¤orts for the n players. There
are n contestants, ei refers to the e¤ort contestant i makes and pi(e) refers to
the probability with which contestant i wins the contest. Mathematically, the
parameter r is the elasticity of the odds of winning for contestant i.16 It is often
interpreted as indicating returns to scale in e¤orts: if r > 1 (r < 1; r = 1), then
returns to scale are increasing (decreasing, constant). So r can be seen as the
discriminatory power of the Power CSF (note the Power CSF becomes perfectly
discriminating as r ! +1).
More intuitively, we could interpret r as the cognitive ability or the accuracy
level of the contest designer. The greater r is, the higher cognitive ability the
contest designer has and the more accurate the contest designer is. In practice,
15The Power CSF has also been called the Tullock CSF. Skaperdas (1996) derives the Power
CSF from easily interpretable axioms the Power CSF is the only continuous success functional
form which satises all the following axioms: (1) Imperfect Discrimination, (2) Monotonicity,
(3) Anonymity, (4) Consistency, (5) Independence and (6) Homogeneity. This justies the
popularity of the Power CSF and is one important reason why we use it in this paper. For a
review of the general properties of Contest Success Functions, see Skaperdas(1996).
16Note here r =
d ln[pi(e)=(1  pi(e))]
d ln ei
i.e., r measures percentage changes of pi(e)=(1  pi(e))
in response to a one percent change of ei.
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the contest designer often has ways to increase or decrease the accuracy level.
For example, in an essay contest, the marker can spend more time on marking
each essay and do more comparisons between essays, etc. By doing this, r will be
greater. On the contrary, if he decreases the time on marking each essay, like he
only gives himself few minutes to mark each essay, r must be lower.
In the previous literature on imperfectly discriminating contests, most re-
searchers take r as an exogenous variable. One important reason might be that
most researchers focus on the symmetric case with symmetric contestants, the
higher r is, the greater the total e¤ort elicited from the contestants. Therefore, it
is widely believed that the contest designer always has an incentive to increase r,
so from the contest designers point of view, r has already been increased to the
highest possible level.
The two papers most closely related to the present research are Michaels (1988)
and Nti (2004). Michaels (1988) nds that r = 2 is optimal for the symmetric val-
uations case when the contest designer can choose r to maximize total e¤ort17.
Nti (2004) looks at the asymmetric valuations case and nds that there exists an
optimal r in the region where a pure-strategy equilibrium exists. The main di¤er-
ences between this paper and Ntis are two: rstly, contestants are heterogeneous
in ability in our model while contestants have di¤erent valuations (to the same
prize) in Ntis model, which leads to di¤erent conclusions and applications; sec-
ondly, except for the case where a unique pure-strategy equilibrium exists (for any
r 2 (0; r]), we also look at the case where a mixed-strategy equilibrium exists (for
any r 2 (r;+1)) while Nti does not.18
17With symmetric contestants, the maximum value of r is 2 to ensure a pure-strategy equilib-
rium exists.
18The parameter r will be explained later in detail. You will nd that in this paper a unique
pure-strategy equilibrium exists for any r 2 (0; r], and at least one mixed-stategy equilibria exist
for any r 2 [ r;+1).
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In this paper, we build a model with two contestants who are heterogeneous
in ability and show that when the contestants are su¢ ciently di¤erent in their
abilities, there exists an optimal accuracy level, which maximizes total e¤ort. So
from the contest designers point of view, it is not true that the total e¤ort always
increases with the accuracy level. Hence, if the contest designers objective is to
maximize the total e¤ort, r should not be increased to the highest possible level.
Additionally, we also nd that the optimal accuracy level would decrease when the
two contestants become more di¤erent in ability.
If the contestants are su¢ cient di¤erent in ability, when the contest designer
increases the accuracy level, intuitively there are two e¤ects. Firstly, it increases
every contestants incentive to invest more e¤ort since the competition is more
erce as r increases. Secondly, the less able contestant realizes he is less likely
to win as r increases it decreases his incentive to invest more e¤ort. So when r
increases to some certain level, the less able contestant starts to invest less e¤ort, in
turn this will again cause the more able contestant to invest less e¤ort. Therefore,
after r reaches this level, total e¤ort falls and this level of r is the optimal accuracy
level. When the di¤erence in their abilities becomes larger, the less able contestant
becomes even weaker compared with his opponent, he will start to invest less e¤ort
earlier and so total e¤ort falls earlier than in the previous case. Hence the optimal
level of r decreases. Therefore, as a contest designer who wants to maximize
total e¤ort, he should set r at the optimal accuracy level instead of the highest
possible level and the optimal accuracy level decreases when contestants become
more di¤erent in ability.
Besides the table tennis example we gave at the beginning of this paper, our
model can help us with explaining or understanding some other phenomena in the
real world. In 1976, FIFA changed the tie-breaking method from replay to penalty-
shootout. We believe that a shootout is more like a random draw compared with
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replays. So why did FIFA make football matches less accurate? In dive meets, the
judges are not allowed to see the slow motion while the audience can see it right
after each dive. Though all the judges are professional, no one can argue that
letting them see the slow motion would help them in increasing their accuracy
level. Then why not? Besides that, there are other examples which may look
stranger. In a lot of sports, every athlete only has one shot, like the balance beam.
Why not give them more chances considering it is very easy to have some bad miss
on the balance beam even for a world-class athlete. In a long-jump match, every
athlete only has three chances, why not give them more chances given it is almost
costless to let them jump several more times. There are of course many reasons
why these restrictions are a good idea. Our analysis highlights one, the contest
designer may wish to reduce accuracy to increase total e¤ort in some situations.
2.2 The Model
There are two risk-neutral contestants involved in a contest with a single prize
V . Each contestant, say contestant i, has a linear cost function, costi = ciei
(i = 1; 2) where ei refers to contestant is e¤ort level and ci is contestant is ability
parameter. It can be seen that the more able the contestant is, the lower his
ability parameter is. Contestant 1 has an ability parameter c1 and contestant 2
has an ability parameter c2 = c  c1. Assume that contestant 1 is more able than
contestant 2, so c > 1. The probability of winning is dened by the Power Contest
Success Function (the Power CSF, see (37)). All the parameters (r, c1 and c2) are
common knowledge.
Each contestants aim is to maximize his expected prot, i = PiV  ciei where
Pi represents contestant is probability of winning. Each contestant can freely
choose to stay active in the contest by making a positive e¤ort or stay inactive by
making zero e¤ort. The contest designers aim is to maximize the expected total
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e¤ort.19
The timing of the model is as follows. First the contest designer chooses an
accuracy level r which he can commit to. Then, given that the values of c1, c2
and r are public information, contestants make their e¤orts. Finally, the contest
designer chooses the winner by applying the Power CSF with the r he chooses in
the rst stage.
2.2.1 The Pure-strategy Equilibrium
The Equilibrium Total E¤ort In this section we assume that the contest
designer can costlessly choose his accuracy level from the set (0; r], where the
value r is determined to ensure that a pure-strategy equilibrium exists which we
will explain in detail later.
Given contestant 1 makes an e¤ort e1 and contestant 2 makes an e¤ort e2, the











V   c2e2: (38)
Each contestant chooses his e¤ort level to maximize his expected prot. In Ap-
pendix 2A, we show that subject to participation constraints, there always exists
a unique pure-strategy equilibrium where contestant 1 makes an e¤ort e1 and


















19In many cases, we may have aims other than maximizing total e¤ort, like the contest designer
may care about the social welfare instead of the e¤ort level, he may care about waste from
duplication like in an R&D contests where increased e¤ort entails wasteful duplication. In some
other cases the contest designer may just want to identify the most able agent as accurately as
possible and does not really care about the e¤ort level. However, in this paper we focus our
attention on the cases where the contest designers aim is to maximize the total e¤ort.
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The contest designers aim is to maximize the total e¤ort:






To make sure of the existence of the pure-strategy equilibrium, all contestants
participation constraints must hold, i.e., each contestants expected prot should
be greater than or equal to zero in equilibrium:
1je1=e1; e2=e2  0, 2je1=e1; e2=e2  0: (42)
In Appendix 2B we show that to make (42) hold, r 2 (0; r] where r satises
cr = 1=(r  1). We also nd that as c increases from 1 to +1, r decreases from 2
to 1. The following proposition summarizes the results so far.
Proposition 6 For any r 2 (0; r], there always exists a unique pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium, where r satises cr = 1=(r   1). As c increases from 1 to +1, r






























































) < 0 when r > br;
where br satises
1 + cbr   (cbr   1) log cbr = 0 () br  log4:68c ): (46)
When c  4:68, br  1 < r since (46), it must be the case that br locates in the
region (0; r] where a unique pure-strategy equilibrium exists; when c < 4:68, br > 1
since (46), to ensure that br locates in the region (0; r], we need cbr < 1=(br   1). In
Appendix 2D, we show that
cbr < 1=(br   1)) c > 3:5665:
Therefore, when c > 3:5665, br locates in the region (0; r], so TE and ei increase
with r when r < br and decrease with r when r > br; when c  3:5665, TE always
increases with r in the region (0; r].
From (46), it can be seen that br decreases when c increases, which means the
bigger the di¤erence in the contestantsabilities, the sooner dTE=dr and dei =dr
would turn to negative when r increases. In Appendix 2D we also show that TE
and ei approach zero as r goes to zero. The following proposition summarizes
these results.
Proposition 7 (1) Total e¤ort (TE) and individual e¤ort (ei ) approach zero as
r goes to zero: TE ! 0 and ei ! 0 as r ! 0. (2) When c > 3:5665, in the
region where r 2 (0; r], the optimal accuracy level is br where br satises (46), andbr decreases when c increases. (3) When c  3:5665, in the region where r 2 (0; r],
the optimal accuracy level is r.
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From the above results, we can see when the accuracy level (r) is extremely low
(r ! 0), no player is willing to put in any e¤ort because the winning probability
is always close to a half no matter how much e¤ort he makes. In the region where
r 2 (0; br), with an increase of the accuracy level, both players would make more
e¤ort in equilibrium. This is because when r is small, both contestantse¤orts are
low, as r increases, by making one additional unit of e¤ort, the marginal revenue is
big compared with the marginal cost20. However, when r increases above br, both
contestants have already made relatively large e¤orts, as r increases, by making
one additional unit of e¤ort, the marginal revenue is small compared with the
marginal cost, and this is true especially for the less able contestant who has a
bigger marginal cost. Hence the less able contestant will decrease his e¤ort at
the point r = br where the marginal revenue equals marginal cost. The more able
contestant will nd that it is optimal to decrease e¤ort at the same point given
his opponent does so, so total e¤ort (TE) falls after br. Therefore, br is optimal for
the contest designer who wants to maximize the total e¤ort in the region where
r 2 (0; r]. Intuitively, we can think of the less able contestant as rst rising to
and then shrinking from competition as r rises. So br is the point where the less
able contestant starts to shrink facing the competition. The result the optimal
accuracy level br decreases as c increases indicates that when the contestants
become more di¤erent in ability, the optimal accuracy level decreases. Intuitively,
this shows that when the less able contestant becomes even weaker compared with
his opponent, he will shrink earlier than before. For example, when c goes to
innity which means the less able contestant is extremely weak compared with his
opponent, br approaches zero.
20Recall that the marginal cost is always c1 for the more able contestant and c2 = c  c1 for
the less able contestant where c > 1.
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we can see that the probability of winning for the less able contestant always
decreases with an increase of r, so decreasing the accuracy level actually increases
the probability of winning for the less able contestant in a fair way. So when r > br,
by reducing the accuracy level r, the less able contestant is encouraged, hence he
increases his e¤ort which causes the more able contestant to invest more e¤ort as
well.
Figure 2 depicts the case with c1 = 1, c2 = 6 where r 2 (0; r]. We can calculate
that r  1:132 and br  0:861. So when r < 1:132, there always exists a pure-
strategy equilibrium where both contestants make positive e¤ort. It is clear to see
that total e¤ort and each individual e¤ort (TE; e1 and e

1) are maximized when r
reaches the optimal level br. After that, TE, e1 and e2 are decreasing in r.
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Other Findings in the Pure-strategy Equilibrium How will each contes-
tants expected prot change as r increases from 0 to r. In Appendix 2E, we show
that:
1 =
cr(1 + cr   r)V
(1 + cr)2
; 2 =












 crV [1 + cr + (1 + r + cr(1  r)) log c]
(1 + cr)3
: (50)
In Appendix 2E, we nd the following results by analyzing the above equations.
(1) 1   2 > 0, which means the more able contestant always makes higher
prot than the less able one.
(2) @(1 2)=@r > 0, which shows the di¤erence in the two contestantsprots
gets greater when r increases.
(3) @2=@r < 0, which indicates that the less able contestants expected prot
decreases from V=2 to 0 when r increases from 0 to r.
(4) @1=@r can be positive, negative or zero. When c is small, @

1=@r  0 for
all r; when c is medium, @1=@r  0 for small r and @1=@r > 0 for big r; when c
is big, @1=@r > 0 for all r.
Intuitively, the less able contestant always prefers a smaller r, but the more
able contestants preference depends on the di¤erence between the contestants
abilities when the di¤erence is small, the more able contestants prot decreases
as r increases; when the di¤erence is big, the more able contestants prot increases
as r increases.
So far, we have analyzed the equilibrium e¤ort levels when r changes given the
ability parameters c1 and c2 unchanged. Next, we are going to analyze the case















It is not a surprise that @e1=@c1 < 0 and @e

2=@c2 < 0, which means when a
contestant is more able, he makes more e¤ort. But @e1=@c2 < 0 and @e

2=@c1 > 0
are very interesting. This tells us that the more able contestant always increases
(decreases) his e¤ort level when his opponent gets more (less) able but the less
able contestant always decreases (increases) his e¤ort level when his opponent gets
more (less) able. So intuitively, we can think of this as an advantage of the more
able contestant he will always increase his e¤ort when his opponent gets more
able (as long as he is more able than his opponent), while the less able contestant
always decrease his e¤ort when his opponent gets more able.
2.2.2 Mixed-strategy Equilibrium when r 2 [r;+1)
In the previous discussion, we focus on the case when r 2 (0; r] where a unique
pure-strategy equilibrium exists. In this section, we are going to look at the case
when r 2 [r;+1) where the pure-strategy equilibrium does not exist, but one or
multiple mixed-strategy equilibria exist.
The All-pay Auction Equilibrium when r 2 [2;+1) In the existing liter-
ature, there are only a few papers (Baye (1994) and Alcalde and Dahm (2007))
discussing the situation when r  r where one or multiple mixed-strategy equilib-
ria exist. Alcalde and Dahm (2007) have proved that in Tullocks Rent-Seeking
Game21, when r  2 there exists a mixed-strategy equilibrium which they call the
all-pay auction equilibrium22. Alcade and Dahm derive an all-pay auction equilib-
rium23 with asymmetric valuations V1  V2 = V from the Tullocks Rent-Seeking
Game, i.e., the case with symmetric valuations V1 = V2 = V . We derive the
21Tullocks Rent-seeking Game in their paper is the same with our model in this paper with
c1 = c2 = 1. Notice that r = 2 in Tullocks Rent-seeking Game.
22We also refer this kind of equilibrium as all-pay auction equilibrium in this paper.
23See Alcade and Dahm (2007) for details.
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following proposition by using similar techniques.
Proposition 8 Let CA be a two-player contest with asymmetric abilities c1 < c2
with c2=c1 = c. Let CS be the same contest with symmetric ability cs1 = c
s
2 = c2.
If  = (1; 

2) is a symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy prole to C
S in which
the rent is completely dissipated in expectation, then the following strategy prole
v = (v1; v

2) constitutes a Nash equilibrium to C
A: contestant 1 uses strategy
v1 = 

1, contestant 2s strategy v

2 is that he uses 

2 with probability 1=c and stays
inactive (i.e. makes zero e¤ort) with probability 1  (1=c).
Proof. Alcade and Dahm (2007) have proved that: when c1 = c2 = 1, for any
r 2 [2;+1), there exists an all-pay auction equilibrium where the expected e¤ort
of each contestant is V=2. Based on the this, we can easily show that when c1 =
c2, for any r 2 [2;+1), there exists an all-pay auction equilibrium where the
expected e¤ort of each contestant is V=(2c2).
In CS, the symmetry of the game assures that on average each player wins half
of the time, each contestants expected revenue is:
E() = (V=2)  c2V=(2c2) = 0:
So in CS the rent is completely dissipated in expectation. Because v1 = 

1 and
cs2 = c2 in C
S and CA, any pure strategy for contestant 2 in CA yields the same as
that in CS and contestant 2 obtains E2(v) = 0. So in CA, he is willing to stay
inactive (i.e. make zero e¤ort) with probability 1  (1=c).
In CS given contestant 2s strategy 2, contestant 1s pure strategy b
s
1 in the




) = E[Prfplayer 1 wins j bs1; g]V   cs1bs1
= E[Prfplayer 1 wins j bs1; g]V   c2bs1: (51)
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In CA, given contestant 2s strategy v2 (which is that he uses 

2 with probability
























We complete the proof by noticing that the bs1 which maximizes (51) must maximize
(52), so contestant 1 does not have an incentive to deviate from v1.














The Mixed-strategy Equilibrium when r 2 [r; 2] So far, we have found
a unique pure-strategy equilibrium for any r 2 (0; r] and also constructed an
all-pay auction equilibrium for any r 2 [2;+1). Next, we construct a mixed-
strategy equilibrium for any r 2 [r; 2] as follows. Given r xed, contestant 1
always participates and makes an e¤ort x (notice here contestant 1 adopts a pure
strategy), while contestant 2 stays inactive with probability 1   p and makes an
e¤ort y with probability p (notice here contestant 2 adopts a mixed strategy).
Note contestant 2 is indi¤erent between participating with e¤ort y and staying
inactive since we assume his expected prot is always zero.
In Appendix 2F, we prove the existence of this mixed-strategy equilibrium and
we summarize the results into the following proposition.
Proposition 9 For any r 2 [r; 2], there always exists a mixed-strategy equilibrium
in which contestant 1 always participates with e¤ort level x, contestant 2 stays
















(r   1)  1r ;
E(TE)m = x + py =
1
c2

















So the expected total e¤ort when r = 2 from the mixed-strategy equilibrium
coincides with that from the all-pay auction equilibrium. When r = r (then
cr = (r   1) 1), in the mixed-strategy equilibrium we have:




























So the mixed-strategy equilibrium when r 2 [r; 2] connects the pure-strategy equi-
librium when r 2 (0; r] and the all-pay auction equilibrium when r 2 [2;+1) by
making the expected total e¤ort continuous in the region where r 2 (0;+1). Next







V (r   1)1  1r ln(r   1); (56)
r  r  2 and 1 < r < 2) ln(r   1) < 0 and (r   1)1  1r > 0:
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Then according to (56), we derive when r  r  2, dE(TE)m=dr < 0. Therefore,
in the mixed-strategy equilibrium when r 2 [r; 2], the expected total e¤ort always
decreases with an increase of r.
To sum up, we have constructed the entire equilibrium set where r 2 (0;+1),
which consists of region (0; r] where a unique pure-strategy equilibrium exists for
any r in this region, region [r; 2] where a mixed-strategy equilibrium exists for any
r in this region and region [2;+1) where an all-pay auction equilibrium exists for
any r in this region. We nd that the expected total e¤ort always decreases when
r 2 [r; 2] and stays constant when r 2 [2;+1). Therefore, in this equilibrium set,
the optimal accuracy level in the region (0; r] is the optimal accuracy level in the
entire region (0;+1).24
Figure 3 depicts the case with c1 = 1, c2 = 6, where r 2 (0;+1). We can
calculate that r  1:132 and br  0:861. We can see that for any r 2 (0; 1:132]
(in region A) a unique pure-strategy equilibrium exists, for any r 2 [1:132; 2] (in
24We have not been able to rule out other mixed-strategy equilibria when r 2 [r;+1), so this
is only a ranking of equilibria that have been characterized.
58
region B) a mixed-strategy equilibrium exists, and for any r 2 [2;+1] (in region
C) an all-pay auction equilibrium exists. It is clear to see that the expected total
e¤ort is maximized when r reaches the optimal level br  0:861. After that, TE
decreases with r in region A and B and remains unchanged in region C.
2.3 Concluding Comments
In this paper, we interpret r in the Power CSF as the accuracy level of the contest
designer. We claim that in many circumstances the contest designer has ways to
change r, i.e., increase or decrease the accuracy level. The question we ask is, is
it always better to be more accurate? With symmetric contestants the answer is
quite simple, it has been shown that increasing accuracy (r) always increases total
e¤ort when r < 2 and when r  2 the expected total e¤ort stays constant25 with
an increase of r.
In this paper, we look at a model with two contestants who are heterogeneous in
ability. We construct an equilibrium set on r 2 (0;+1), which consists of the pure-
strategy equilibrium region when r 2 (0; r], the mixed-strategy equilibrium region
when r 2 [r; 2] and the all-pay auction equilibrium region when r 2 [2;+1). We
have shown that when the di¤erence between the contestantsabilities is relatively
small (c  3:5665), total e¤ort always increases with an increase of r when r 2
(0; r] and stays constant after that. When the di¤erence between the contestants
abilities is relatively big (c > 3:5665), the expected total e¤ort increases with an
increase of r until r reaches the optimal point br where br < r, after that total
e¤ort decreases in region (br; 2] with an increase of r and stays constant in region
[2;+1). We also nd that the optimal accuracy level (br) decreases when the
contestants become more di¤erent in ability. Therefore, in a contest with players
who are heterogeneous in ability, it is not always true that the more accurate the
25With symmetric contestants, r = 2, the expected total e¤ort is fully dissipated when r  2.
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better, especially when there is a big di¤erence between the contestantsabilities.
Although it is reasonable to assume that there is always room for the contest
designer to reduce his accuracy as long as r > 0, in many cases the contest de-
signers ability of increasing accuracy is bounded above. In cases where the feasible
accuracy level is in the region (0; r], we can restrict attention to pure-strategies. In
such cases we have a unique optimal accuracy level br. However, if accuracy levels
above r are possible, we need to consider mixed-strategies. Although we still have
the same optimal accuracy level for the equilibria we characterize, we are unable to
rule out the existence of other mixed strategy equilibria. Therefore, our strongest
results are for cases where there is this upper limit r on accuracy levels.
In recent years with the rapid development of technologies, some people have
argued that it is time to introduce high-tech into sports (like tennis, football and
basketball, etc.) to make the outcomes of the games a more accurate reection
of ability. In many cases, this has already been done. However, our model shows
one reason for not using accuracy increasing technologies such as replays. If we
think of sportsmen as having di¤erent inherent abilities then more accuracy may
reduce the e¤ort that they put into training and therefore reduce skill levels and
the entertainment value of the games.
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2.4 Appendix 2A
Assume there exists a pure-strategy equilibrium and in the equilibrium: contestant
1 makes an e¤ort e1 = a and contestant 2 makes an e¤ort e

2 = b (a > b since
contestant 1 is more able). From contestant 1s point of view, given contestant
2 makes an e¤ort b, he would want to choose an e¤ort level x to maximize his















From contestant 2s point of view, given contestant 1 makes an e¤ort a, he would




















































Next, we show the second order conditions are always satised when e1 = e1
and e2 = e2, i.e.,
d21
de21
je1=e1; e2=e2 < 0;
d22
de22
je1=e1; e2=e2 < 0:
















Substituting e1 = a = cb into (59), we have
d21
de21
je1=a; e2=b =  
rV a 2+rb2r
(ar + br)3








je1=a; e2=b < 0:
Given contestant 1 makes an e¤ort a, if contestant 2 makes an e¤ort e2, his ex-




















[cr(r   1))  (r + 1)];
62
* 2  0) cr(r   1)  1









V   c1a =
cr(1 + cr   r)V
(1 + cr)2
 0




V   c2b =
(1  cr(r   1))V
(1 + cr)2
 0
) cr(r   1)  1:
therefore,
1je1=e1; e2=e2  0) c
r  r   1; (61)
2je1=e1; e2=e2  0) c
r(r   1)  1: (62)
When r  1, it is always the case that cr(r  1)  1 and cr  r  1, thus the pure-
strategy equilibrium always exists. When r > 1, to make sure the pure-strategy
equilibrium exists, by (61) and (62) the following condition must hold:
r   1  cr  1
r   1 : (63)
If (63) holds, it must be the case that r  2, otherwise r   1 > 1=(r   1). When
r  2, we always have r   1  cr. So (63) changes to
cr  1
r   1 :
Given c constant, to make sure that the pure-strategy equilibrium exists, it must
be the case that
r  r, where r satises cr = 1
r   1 :
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Let f(c; r) = cr   1
r   1 = 0, we have
@f
@c





(r   1)2 + c


















When c = 1, cr   1
r   1 = 1 
1
r   1 = 0;
) r = 2;
When c ! +1, lim
c!+1
cr   1
r   1 = 0
) r ! 1:
So, we can safely conclude that when c increases from 1 to +1, r decreases from
2 to 1.
2.6 Appendix 2C




























are all determined on the sign of f(r).
df(r)
dr
= [1  cr log cr] log c, d
2f(r)
dr2
=  cr(log c)2[1 + r log c] < 0:
f(r)jr=0 = 2 > 0,
df(r)
dr
jr=0 = log c > 0, and
df(r)
dr
decreases as r increases (since
d2f(r)
dr2
< 0). Let r = br where
f(br) = 1 + cbr   (cbr   1) log cbr = 0 () cbr  4:68):
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Therefore, we can conclude that
f(r) > 0 when r < br;
f(r) = 0 when r = br;




























) < 0 when r > br
where br satises
1 + cbr   (cbr   1) log cbr = 0 () cbr  4:68):
2.7 Appendix 2D
When br  1; cbr  4:68) c  4:68;
When br > 1; cbr  1=(br   1) and cbr  4:68
) 4:68  1=(br   1)
) br  1:21368, and cbr  4:68
) c  3:5665:
So to make sure br locates in the region [0; r], we need c  3:5665. In other


































Substituting (40) into (38), we have
1 =




(1 + cr   crr)V
(1 + cr)2
:










 crV [1 + cr + (1 + r + cr(1  r)) log c]
(1 + cr)3
:
Since cr  r   1, we can derive that




< 0. The sign of
@1
@r
depends on the sign of g(c; r) where




cr   (r   1) + crr(1 + r) log c
c
> 0 since cr  r   1:
So g increases as c increases. We also derive
@g
@r
= (cr(1 + r) log c  1) log c; (64)
gjr=0 = 2(log c  1): (65)
From (64) and (65), we can see that when c  e  2:718,
gjr=0 = 2(log c  1)  0 and
@g
@r
= (cr(1 + r) log c  1) log c > 0:
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So when c is big (c  e  2:718), @1=@r  0 for all r 2 (0; r]. When c < e  2:718,
there are two possible cases. The rst case is when c is small where g  0 for all r.
The second case is when c is medium, although gjr=0 < 0, g increases with r when
@g=@r = (cr(1+r) log c 1) log c > 0 and g > 0 after r exceeds some certain value.
To sum up, when c is small, @1=@r  0 for all r, when c is medium, @1=@r  0
for small r and @1=@r > 0 for big r, and when c is big @

1=@r  0 for all r.
2.9 Appendix 2F
From contestant 1s point of view, given his opponents strategy is staying inactive




+ (1  p)gV   c1x: (66)
Since x is the maximizer of (66), then we have
c1((x
)r + (y)r)2 = (y)r(x) 1+rprV: (67)




V   c2y: (68)
Since y is the maximizer of (68), then we have
c2((x
)r + (y)r)2 = (x)r(y) 1+rrV: (69)





V   c2(y) = 0: (70)








) x = (c2
c1
)py = cpy: (71)























) prcr = 1
(r   1) ; (74)
) p = 1
c
(r   1)  1r : (75)












To make sure of the existence of the mixed-strategy equilibrium we proposed,







[(1 + r)xr   (r   1)yr)]:
In equilibrium x = cpy, prcr = (r   1) 1;
* (1 + r)xr   (r   1)yr
= yr((1  r) + (1 + r)prcr)
=
yrr(3  r)





















jx=x; y=y < 0 when r  r  2:
Therefore, we can safely express the expected total e¤ort in equilibrium as follows
E(TE)m = x + py










3 Chapter 3: The Power Contest Success Func-
tion and the Power Contest Defeat Function
3.1 Introduction
In the theory of contests, we can distinguish between two main branches in the
literature. Firstly, perfectly discriminating contests e¤ort is perfectly observable
and the contestants making irreversible e¤ort are designated the winners according
to their e¤ort levels: the highest-e¤ort contestant wins the rst prize, the second
highest-e¤ort contestant wins the second prize and so on. Perfectly discriminat-
ing contests have been studied extensively by Hillman and Samet (1987), Hillman
and Riley (1989) and Krishna & Morgan (1997) for the case of a single prize,
and the cases of several prizes has also been studied by Clark and Riis(1998) and
Moldovanu and Sela (2001), among others. Secondly, imperfectly discriminating
contests  e¤ort is not perfectly observable, so the contestant who expends the
largest e¤ort may not win the prize, but the probability of a particular contestant
winning is increasing in his e¤ort and decreasing in the e¤ort of the opponents. In
either literature, the focus has been on the case in which a number of contestants
compete to win prizes and much less attention is paid to punishing the bottom
players. However, except rewarding top players (winners), punishing bottom play-
ers (losers) is also a popular way to motivate contestants to compete and actually
occurs often in practice. For instance, when assigning University course marks, 5%
of the students will be failed; or the worst interns will be red at the end of their
internship. What conclusions can we draw if we consider punishments in contests?
In Chapter 1, we look at punishment in the literature on perfectly discriminating
contests, this paper (Chapter 3) is an attempt to take both prizes and punishments
into account in the literature on imperfectly discriminating contests.
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The Power Contest Success Function (the Power CSF, proposed by Tullock
in 1980), has been much used to select the winner or multiple winners in the
literature on imperfectly discriminating contests. However, things become more
complicated in a technical way when the contest designer wants to identify the
bottom players in order to punish them. This is because we need the whole rank
of all contestants to identify the bottom players (i.e. the losers) in the Power
CSF mechanism. In this paper, we propose the Power Contest Defeat Function
(Power CDF) which successively eliminates the loser at a time. We show that the
Power CDF has the same good qualities as the Power CSF and is more realistic
in some cases. For instance, suppose several cities are in a competition to host
the Olympic Games, one city is going to be eliminated in each round until only
one city remains, which is the winner  in the contest of hosting 2012 Olympic
games, Moscow was eliminated in the rst round, New York in the second round,
and then Madrid in the third round, Paris was eliminated in the last round and
so the winner was London.
In this paper we look at both the Power CSF mechanism (selecting winners in
sequence) and the Power CDF mechanism (selecting losers in sequence) and show
that punishments increase expected total e¤orts signicantly. More interestingly,
we also nd that when the contestantse¤ort levels are di¤erent, the Power CDF
mechanism is more accurate in nding the correct winner (the one who makes the
greatest e¤ort) and the Power CSF mechanism is more accurate in nding the
correct loser (the one who makes the smallest e¤ort). In other words, the multi-
step mechanism provides more accuracy in nding the correct winner or loser.
The Power CSF mechanism and the Power CDF mechanism imply two di¤erent
procedures and yield di¤erent results. In the mean time, compared with the Power
CSF mechanism, the Power CDF mechanism is no more complicated and more
realistic in some cases, then why hasnt the Power CDF been proposed and used
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before while the Power CSF has been studied extensively since it was proposed by
Tullock in 1980? The main reason might be because in the literature on contests,
the focus has been on the top players who can acquire prizes (i.e. the winners)
and less attention has been paid to the bottom players who can be punished (i.e.
the losers).
3.2 The Power Contest Success Function (CSF)
3.2.1 Denition of the Power CSF
In an imperfectly discriminating contest, all contestants compete for prizes by
expending e¤ort so as to increase their probability of winning. In this literature,
a critical component of a contest is the Contest Success Function (CSF) which
provides each players probability of winning for any given level of e¤orts. The
Power CSF26 was rst proposed by Tullock (1980) to study the problem of rival
rent-seekers who expend resources to inuence the policy outcome in their favor,
and it has been widely employed and analyzed in research since then. The Power






if maxfe1; :::eng > 0;
pi(e) = 1=n otherwise,
where e = (e1; e2; :::; :en) denotes a vector of e¤orts for the n players. In the above
Power CSF, there are n contestants, ei refers to the e¤ort contestant i makes
and pi(e) refers to the probability that contestant i wins the contest. We assume
that the parameter r is an exogenous variable where r  0. Mathematically, r is
the elasticity of the odds of winning27 for contestant i. It is often interpreted as
26It also has been called the Tullock CSF.
27Note here r =
d ln[pi(e)=(1  pi(e))]
d ln ei
; i.e., r measures the percentage changes of pi(e)=(1  
pi(e)) in response to one percent change of ei.
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indicating returns to scale in e¤orts: if r > 1, r < 1 or r = 1, then returns to
scale are increasing, decreasing or constant. So r can be seen as the discriminatory
power of the Power CSF. Note that as r ! +1 the Power CSF becomes perfectly
discriminating.
What are the reasons why the Power CSF has been used extensively in the
literature apart from its analytical convenience? Skaperdas (1996) derives the
Power CSF from easily interpretable axioms, which justies the Power CSF by
showing that the Power CSF is the only continuous success functional form which
satises all the following axioms28.
1.
P
i2n pi(e) = 1 and pi(e)  0.
2. For all i 2 n, pi(e) is increasing in ei and decreasing in ej for all i 6= j.
3. For any two di¤erent contestants i 6= j (given other contestantse¤orts the
same), pi(e) = pj(e) if ei = ej.
4. Let N be the set of players who may participate in a contest. Denote by
pMi (e) the i
th contestants probability of success who participates in a contest
among the members of the subsetM (i:e: M  N) which we assume to have
at least two elements and
P
j2M pj(e) > 0, p
M
i (e) = pi(e)=[
P
j2M pj(e)].
5. pMi (e) is independent of the e¤orts of the players who are not included in the
subset M ( N).
6. Let e = (e1; e2; :::; en), then pi(e) = pi(e).
3.2.2 The Power CSF Mechanism
In the literature on imperfectly discriminating contests, most papers focus on the
rst-prize contest in which the winner is determined by applying the Power CSF
28For a review of the general properties of Contest Success Functions, see Skaperdas(1996).
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once, there is relatively little on multi-prize context. Berry (1993) and Clark and
Riis (1996) present a method, based on an imperfectly discriminating rent-seeking
game, for distributing several homogeneous rents in which each player may win no
more than once. Clark and Riis (1998 c) present a contribution to the analysis of
imperfectly discriminating rent-seeking contests with several positive prizes.
In the imperfectly discriminating context with multiple prizes, the following
procedure has been much used to select multiple winners, which we call the Power
CSF mechanism in this paper. Given each contestant has made his e¤ort, rstly,
the contest designer29 selects the winner (the one who gets the rst prize) by
applying the Power CSF once, then the contest designer takes the winner out
and he selects the second winner (the one who gets the second prize) among the
remaining contestants by applying the Power CSF again30. This procedure goes
on until the last winner has been chosen. Intuitively, the Power CSF mechanism
describes a procedure selecting winners in sequence, i.e., from the rst player who
gets the rst prize to the player who gets the last prize.
Example 1 In a contest with three contestants, with a Power CSF where r = 1,
suppose the contestants e¤ort levels are e1 = 1, e2 = 2, e3 = 3 respectively.
Assume the contest designer allocates three prizes31 where a1 > a2 > a3. Each
contestant has a certain probability of winning any of the prizes in the Power CSF
mechanism. We list all the possible ranks and their corresponding probabilities in
table 1.
29It can also be called the contest administrator.
30Note that the Power CSF can be used several times in this context due to it satisfying
Property 4 above (see Skaperdas (1996)).
31Here, the prizes do not necessarily have to be positive, some might be negative prizes, i.e.,










It can be seen that in each row of table 1, the left part refers to the rank of the
contestants and the right part refers to the probability of this rank occurring. For
example, the rst row f123; 4=60g indicates there is a 4=60 chance that this contest
will end up with rank 123 (rank 123 means contestant 1 wins a1, contestant 2 wins
a2 and contestant 3 wins a3). The following is how we calculate this probability:
given e1 = 1, e2 = 2 and e3 = 3, there is a probability of 1=(1 + 2 + 3) = 1=6
that contestant 1 is selected as the winner who gets a1. Given a1 is allocated
to contestant 1, between contestant 2 and contestant 3, there is a probability of
2=(2 + 3) = 2=5 that contestant 2 is selected as the winner who gets a2. So the
probability of rank 123 occurring is 1=6 2=5 = 4=60. By a similar procedure, we
can calculate the probabilities of all other possible results.
3.2.3 The Power CSF Model
We state the assumptions of the Power CSF model as follows:
1. There are n contestants and n prizes: a1 > a2 > a3::: > an 1 > an. Note
here we do not assume the prizes must be positive, that is to say, there could
be some zero prizes and negative prizes (i.e. punishments) for the bottom
players.32
32The main di¤erences between this model and that in Derek J. Clark and Chiristian Riis
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2. Every contestant has the same linear cost function: cost = x, where x is the
e¤ort level; i.e., contestants are symmetric in ability.
3. Contestants are risk neutral and rational; the value of prizes (a1, a2, :::, an)
and the discriminatory power (r) are public information.
4. The result of the contest is determined by the Power CSF mechanism.
We prove the following proposition in Appendix 3A:
Proposition 10 In a unique symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium33 of the Power

















n  j : (78)




















By analyzing (78), (79) and (80) in Appendix 3A, we prove the following results:
(1998 c) are: in their model with n contestants there are k prizes where 1  k < n and all prizes
must be strictly positive.
33Note that r has to be located in a certain region to ensure the existance of the symmetric
equilibrium. Because the focus of this paper is on the analysis of the equilibrium rather than the
conditions of its existance, we put all the relavant discussions and proof in Appendix 3B.
34Here "average" does not suggest there is a distribution on contestantse¤ort levels because
every contestant makes the same e¤ort in the symmetric equilibrium.
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Proposition 11 In a unique symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium of the Power
CSF model: (a) when n is large, there exists k  b0:632nc where c1; c2; :::; ck 1
are positive and ck ; ck+1; :::; cn are negative35, (b) ci > ci+1, (c)
Pn
i=1 ci = 0,
(d) c1 is smaller than j cn j for n  3 (notice a1 =j an jfor n = 2), (e) when n
increases, j cn j increases faster than c1.
Among the above results, (a) indicates that, from a1 to an, (approximately)
the rst 63.2% prizes have positive e¤ect on increasing total e¤ort while the other
prizes have negative e¤ect on increasing total e¤ort. Notice that the prizes which
locate behind the critical prize (ak), i.e., ak ; ak+1; :::; an, have negative e¤ect on
increasing average e¤ort (since ck ; ck+1; :::; cn are negative). We can treat these
prizes as punishments by making them negative, which means if a contestant gets
this position, he will be punished by su¤ering a loss.
(b) tells us that di¤erent prizes have di¤erent e¤ects on increasing average
e¤ort. Among all prizes, an increase in the rst prize has the biggest e¤ect on
increasing average e¤ort, an increase in the second prize has the second biggest
e¤ect, ......, an increase in the ith prize has the ith biggest e¤ect; and among
all punishments, an increase in the last punishment36 (pn =  an) has the biggest
e¤ect and an increase in the second last punishment (pn 1 =  an 1) has the second
biggest e¤ect, ......, an increase in the last ith punishment has the ith biggest e¤ect























35Firstly, note that bxc or floor(x) is the function that returns the highest integer less than
or equal to x. For example, for n = 10, k  b0:632  10c = b6:32c = 6. Secondly, note
k  b0:632nc is a rough approximately true, but this equation becomes much more accurate as
n gets large, where k  b(1  e 1)nc:
36The last punishment refers to the punishment to a player who ranks last in a contest, and
















; c5 =  
27
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Since c5 and c6 are negative, substituting p5 and p6 for  a5 and  a6 (pi refers to
the punishment a player receives if he ranks ith among all contestants), let cp5 and
















































So from (b) we can clearly see that: if there is a total prize (punishment) sum and
the contest designer determines the distribution of the total prize (punishment)
sum among the di¤erent prizes (punishments), as long as the participation con-
straints hold, in order to maximize total e¤ort it is always optimal for the designer
to allocate the entire prize (punishment) sum to a single prize (punishment), i.e.,
to make a1 and pn (i:e:  an) as big as possible.
(c) simply states that if every prize is increased by the same amount, say
a, the average e¤ort does not change (AEs =
Pn
i=1 cia = a
Pn
i=1 ci = 0).
Because in this model we assume there is a prize for each contestant, increasing
every prize by the same amount means every contestant is better o¤ by the same
amount, however, the competition between all contestants is the same as before.
Therefore, everyone makes the same e¤ort in equilibrium after the change.
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More surprisingly, (d) and (e) indicate that in the Power CSF mechanism with
n  3 contestants, the last punishment is always more e¤ective in increasing
average e¤ort than the rst prize, and if the number of contestants increases, the
last punishment would become more and more e¤ective in increasing average e¤ort




(4a1 + a2   5a3) =
r
18c
(4a1 + a2 + 5p3):
By looking at the above equation, it can be seen that if the contest designer
increases 1 unit (monetary material) on the rst prize (i.e. a1), holding other
prizes xed, the average e¤ort will increase by 4r=18 units. If the contest designer
increases 1 unit on the last punishment (i.e. p3), the average e¤ort will increase
by 5r=18 units. This is also true in all n-contestant cases for n  3.
Why is the last punishment more e¤ective than the rst prize on increasing the
average e¤ort? In our model, getting the last punishment means the bottom player
will lose pn and getting the rst prize means the top player will gain a1. According
to the assumptions of our model, contestants are risk neutral, one might expect
that if pn = a1, the incentive of a player trying to get the rst prize should be as
big as the incentive of a player trying to avoid the punishment, in other words, the
rst prize and last punishment should have the same e¤ect in increasing average
e¤ort. But from result (b), the last punishment is always more e¤ective than rst
prize in increasing average e¤ort. How should we explain this paradox? The key to
answering this question lies in the Power CSF mechanism we use. We will discuss
this question later in this paper.
3.3 The Power Contest Defeat Function (CDF)
The Power CSF has been much used to select winners in the literature on imper-
fectly discriminating contests. However, things are more complicated in a technical
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way when the contest designer wants to identify the bottom players in order to
punish them. This is because we need the whole rank of all contestants to identify
the bottom players (i.e. the losers) in the Power CSF mechanism. Are there other
mechanisms which can be used beside the Power CSF mechanism? If there are,
will the results di¤er and can the di¤erence help us to understand the paradox we
raise before?
In this section we propose the Power Contest Defeat Function (CDF) and
consider selecting losers in sequence in the Power CDF Mechanism. In practice,
there are many applications which have a similar procedure on ranking contestants
or candidates. For instance, suppose several cities are in a competition of hosting
the Olympic Games, one city will be eliminated in each round until only one city
remains, which is the winner. As in the contest of hosting 2012 Olympic games,
Moscow was eliminated in the rst round, New York in the second round, and
then Madrid in the third round, Paris was eliminated in the last round and so the
winner was London. There are other examples, as in some real beauty contests or
TV shows, the judges dont select the winner directly, they eliminate one or several
contestants in each round until one contestant is left, then the last contestant is the
winner and the rank of all contestants can be derived from the order of elimination.
3.3.1 Denition of the Power CDF










for ei = 0 and pi(e) = 0 for ei > 0 otherwise,
where e = (e1; e2; :::; :en) denotes a vector of e¤orts for the n players and m is the
number of contestants making zero e¤ort.
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In the above Power CDF, there are n contestants, ei refers to the e¤ort con-
testant i makes and pi refers to the probability of contestant i losing. As in the
Power CSF, the parameter r is an exogenous variable where r  0 and r here can
be interpreted as indicating returns to scale in e¤orts. If r > 1, r < 1 or r = 1,
then returns to scale are increasing, decreasing or constant. So r is the discrimina-
tory power of the Power CDF and as r ! +1 the Power CDF becomes perfectly
discriminating. It is straightforward to show that the Power CDF satises all the
following axioms (which are similar with the axioms that the Power CSF satises).
1.
P
i2n pi(e) = 1 and pi(e)  0.
2. For all i 2 n, pi(e) is decreasing in ei and increasing in ej for all i 6= j.
3. For any two di¤erent contestants i 6= j (given other contestantse¤orts the
same), pi(e) = pj(e) if ei = ej.
4. Let N be the set of players who may participate in a contest. Denote by
pMi (e) the i
th contestants probability of losing who participates in a contest
among the members of the subsetM (i:e: M  N) which we assume to have
at least two elements and
P
j2M pj(e) > 0, p
M
i (e) = pi(e)=[
P
j2M pj(e)]:
5. pMi (e) is independent of the e¤orts of the players not included in the subset
M( N).
6. Let e = (e1; e2; :::; en), then pi(e) = pi(e).
3.3.2 The Power CDF Mechanism
In a Power CDF mechanism contest designer selects losers in sequence, i.e., from
the rst loser to the last loser (it is obvious that the last loser is the winner).
Consider again Example 1 when the Power CSF is replaced with the Power CDF
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(with r = 1). Each contestant has a certain probability of winning any of the
prizes in the Power CDF mechanism. We list all the possible ranks and their









In each row of table 2, the left part refers to the rank of the contestant and the
right part refers to the probability of this rank occurring. For example, the rst
row (123; 40=660)means there is a 40=660 chance that this contest will end up with
rank 123. The following is how we calculate this probability. Given e1 = 1; e2 = 2





) = 2=11 that contestant 3 is
selected as the rst loser (i.e. he gets a3). Then among the remaining contestants,





that contestant 2 is selected as the loser. So probability of rank 123 occurring
is (2=11)  (1=3) = 40=660. Similarly, we can calculate the probabilities of other
possible ranks. Therefore, the Power CDF mechanism actually implies a procedure
of nding the rank of the contestants by selecting losers in sequence.
3.3.3 The Power CDF Model
The assumptions of the Power CDF model are the same as those of the Power CSF
model except that the result of the contest is determined by the CDF mechanism
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instead of the Power CSF mechanism. In Appendix 3A, we prove the following
proposition.
Proposition 12 In a unique symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium37 of the Power









n  1 + :::+
1
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n  j : (82)
By comparing the results between the Power CSF mechanism and the Power
CDF mechanism, i.e., (77) and (81), we nd that in a n-contestant case, the coef-
cients in the two expressions of the average e¤ort are connected in the following
forms:
cli =  csn i+1;
where csi represents ci in the Power CSF mechanism and c
l
i represents ci in the
Power CDF mechanism.





n  j and c
l














n  j   1 = c
l
i.
Since cli =  csn i+1, we can simply derive the following proposition from Propo-
sition 11.
37Note that r has to be located in a certain region to ensure the existance of the symmetric
equilibrium. See Appendix 3B for details.
38Here "average" does not suggest there is a distribution on contestantse¤ort levels because
every contestant makes the same e¤ort in the symmetric equilibrium.
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Proposition 13 In a unique symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium of the Power
CDF model: (a) c1; c2; :::; ck 1 are positive and ck ; ck+1; :::; cn are negative, where
k  d0:368ne when n is large,39 (b) ci decreases when i increases, (d)
Pn
i=1 ci = 0,
c1 is always bigger than j cn j for n  3 (c1 =j cn j for n = 2), (e) when n increases,
j cn j increases more slowly than c1.
Among the above results, (b) and (c) tell very similar intuitions to that in
the Power CSF mechanism. However, (a) indicates that (approximately) the rst
36.8% prizes have positive e¤ect on increasing total e¤ort while 63.2% in the Power
CSF mechanism. (d) and (e) show that under the Power CDF mechanism, the
rst prize is always more e¤ective than the last punishment, and if the number
of the contestants increases, the rst prize will become more and more e¤ective
compared with the last punishment. So the results of (a), (d) and (e) is just the
reverse of what we nd under the Power CSF mechanism. In the next section, we
will try to investigate this di¤erence from a di¤erent angle.
3.4 Selecting the Highest Ability
In the Power CSF model and the Power CDF model, we analyze a symmetric
equilibrium where each contestant makes the same e¤ort. In this section, we look
at a di¤erent situation where contestants are heterogenous and each contestant
has the same (very short) time constraint of making e¤ort. For example, when a
company wants to recruit new employees, the recruiter will set written exam or
interview for each applicant. In the given time period of the exam or interview,
each applicant will do their best to impress the recruiter, i.e., make the most
39Firstly, dxe or ceiling(x) is the function that returns the smallest integer not less than x. For
example, when n = 100, k  d0:368 100e = d36:8e = 37. Secondly, note that k  d0:368ne is
only approximately true, this equation gets much more accurate when n gets larger, when n is
very large, k  d(e 1)ne:
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possible e¤ort. Therefore, contestants make e¤ort according to their abilities,
i.e., more/less able contestant make more/less e¤ort. Notice that each contestant
will do his/her best in the xed time period because the marginal revenue of
making e¤ort is always more than the marginal cost of making e¤ort. We can see
that in these cases, the contest designer (the recruiter in the example) wants to
select the correct winner instead of maximizing the total e¤ort. In the following
discussion, we try to look at the accuracy level of selecting the correct winner/loser
in the Power CSF mechanism and the Power CDF mechanism40 given that the
contestants are making di¤erent levels of e¤ort.
3.4.1 An Example










We can derive table 5 from table 4:41
40We assume that the contest designer can choose between the two mechanisms with r being
the same.
41
110=660 + 220=660 = 330=660 135=660 + 216=660 = 351=660
165=660 + 220=660 = 385=660 144=660 + 216=660 = 360=660
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CSF CDF
Probability of selecting the correct winner 330=660 351=660
Probability of selecting the correct loser 385=660 360=660
Table 5
From the comparison of the results in table 5, we make the following conjecture:
Conjecture 1 Given that the contestants are making di¤erent levels of e¤ort,
the Power CSF mechanism is more accurate in nding the correct loser while the
Power CDF mechanism is more accurate in nding the correct winner.
Next, we attempt to establish the above conjecture in a more general context
than the example.
3.4.2 3-contestant case
In a 3-contestant case with (very short) time constraint of making e¤ort, assume
that contestant 3 is the most able one and makes the highest e¤ort, contestant
1 is the least able one and makes the smallest e¤ort, i.e., e1 < e2 < e3. Can we
prove the probability of picking contestant 3 as the winner under the Power CSF
mechanism is always smaller than that under the Power CDF mechanism and the
probability of picking contestant 1 as the loser under the Power CSF mechanism is
always bigger than that under the Power CDF mechanism (like we conjectured)?
The answer is positive.
Claim 1 In a 3-contestant model with r being the same in both mechanisms, when
the contestants make di¤erent e¤ort levels, the probability of selecting the correct
winner in the Power CSF mechanism is always smaller than that in the Power
CDF mechanism, and the probability of selecting the correct loser in the Power
CSF mechanism is always bigger than that in the Power CDF mechanism.
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Proof. Let ps and pl be the probability that contestant 3 wins the rst prize under


































































































































* 0 < e1 < e2 < e3 ) e2r3   er1er2 > 0; ) ps   pl < 0:
Therefore, in a 3-contestant case with contestants making di¤erent e¤ort levels,
the probability of selecting the correct winner in the Power CDF mechanism is
always bigger than that in the Power CSF mechanism.
By a similar procedure, we can also prove that the probability of selecting the
correct winner (contestant 1) in the Power CDF is bigger than that in the Power
CSF mechanism. In other words, the Power CSF mechanism is more accurate
in nding the correct loser and the Power CDF mechanism is more accurate in
nding the correct winner.
3.4.3 n-contestant case
We have shown that in a 3-contestant case with contestants making di¤erent e¤ort
levels, the Power CDF (CSF) mechanism is more accurate in nding the correct
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winner (loser). To make this argument stronger, we are going to analyze a specic
model with n contestants.
Claim 2 In a n-contestant model (where n  3) with r being the same in both
mechanisms, suppose only one contestant, say contestant 1, makes an e¤ort e
while all other contestants make the same e¤ort level which we normalize it to 1,
e 6= 1. When e > 1, the probability of selecting the correct winner ( i.e. contestant
1) in the Power CDF mechanism is always bigger than that in the Power CSF
mechanism; while when e < 1, the probability of selecting the correct loser (i.e.
contestant 1) in the Power CSF mechanism is always bigger than that in the Power
CDF mechanism.
Proof. When e > 1, for a 3-contestant case, it is always the case that











(1 + 2er)(1 + er)(2 + er)
> 0:
Next step, we want to prove that for n  3,
pln+1   psn+1 > 0 if pln   psn > 0;
psn =
er
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er > 1 since n  3


















er + n  1
er + n
)psn:
So for any n  3,
pln   psn > 0) pln+1   psn+1 > 0:
If we change the assumptions a bit by assuming that contestant 1 makes the
lowest e¤ort, i.e., e < 1 and all other contestants make the same e¤ort 1. By a
similar procedure, we can prove that the probability of nding the correct loser
(contestant 1) in the Power CSF mechanism is always bigger than that in the
Power CDF mechanism.
3.5 Concluding Comments
The above results, at least to some extent, conrm our conjecture given that the
contestants are making di¤erent levels of e¤ort (according to their abilities), the
Power CSF mechanism is more accurate in nding the correct loser and the Power
CDF mechanism is more accurate in nding the correct winner. Why? In the
Power CSF mechanism, the contest designer only uses one step (apply the Power
CSF once) to select the winner among all contestants, while in the Power CDF
mechanism (with n contestants) the contest designer needs to use multiple steps
(apply the Power CDF n  1 times) to nd the winner. According to our results,
given r the same in both mechanisms, the multi-step mechanism (i.e. the Power
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CDF mechanism) provides more accuracy in nding the correct winner; while
when the aim is to nd the correct loser, the Power CSF mechanism, which takes
multiple steps to nd the loser, is more accurate than the Power CDF mechanism
which selects the loser in one step. Therefore, the multi-step mechanism has an
advantage in nding the correct winner/loser. With the same level of r, it is
not straightforward to see why the multi-step mechanism provides more accuracy.
Intuitively, the reason is that in the multi-step mechanism, with the number of
contestants decreasing, the contest designer is more likely to choose the correct
contestant among all remaining contestants.
With the same r in both mechanisms, if the last punishment and the rst prize
are the same amount monetarily, a rational risk neutral contestant will take the
last punishment more seriously in the Power CSF mechanism and take the rst
prize more seriously in the Power CDF mechanism. This is because the Power
CSF mechanism is more accurate in punishing the one who makes the lowest
e¤ort and the Power CDF mechanism is more accurate in rewarding the one who
makes the highest e¤ort. This also gives an explanation why the last punishment
is more e¤ective than the rst prize in increasing average e¤ort in the Power
CSF mechanism and the rst prize is more e¤ective than the last punishment in
increasing average e¤ort in the Power CDF mechanism.
3.6 Appendix 3A
Proof of Proposition 10
Our aim is to prove that in a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium, the expression
of average e¤ort each contestant makes is AEs. We prove it by mathematical
induction.
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where pi is contestant iprobability of winning and ei is contestant ie¤ort.
















where Li is contestant is expected utility. Each contestant maximizes his expected
revenue, in the symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium42 (contestants 1 and 2 will
make the same level of e¤ort since they are symmetric), e1 = e2 = x, then:
@L1
@e1
= 0) x = r(a1   a2)
4
:













so equation (77) holds when n = 2. Existence (of the equilibrium) requires:
@2L1
@e21





  r(a1   a2)
4
 0) r  2a1 + 2a2
a1   a2
:













42In this paper, we restrict our attention to the unique symmetric equilibrium for simplicity,



























t+ 1  j :
In the symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium of the t-contestant and (t+1)-contestant
cases, from any contestants point of view, say contestant 1, given all other con-
testants are making the same e¤ort x,
U t = Lt1a1 + L
t
2a2 + :::+ L
t
iai + :::+ L
t
tat   e1;
U t+1 = Lt+11 a1 + L
t+1
2 a2 + :::+ L
t+1
i ai + :::+ L
t+1
t+1at   e1;
where U t and U t+1 are the expected utilities for contestant 1 in the t contestant
case and (t+1) contestant case respectively; and Lti and L
t+1
i are the probabilities
of winning the ith prize (ai) for contestant 1 in the t-contestant case and the
(t+1)-contestant case respectively. Therefore, Lti or L
t+1
i are the probabilities that
contestant 1 is chosen as the winner in the ith "round" (which indicates contestant
1 has not been chosen as a winner in all previous i  1 rounds). So given that the















(t  i)! = (t  1)(t  2):::(t  i+ 1);
P ti 1 =
t!
(t  i+ 1)! = t(t  1):::(t  i+ 2):
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ai = 1: (85)
Because (77) is true in the t-contestant case,


































t  j )ai: (88)










t  j ): (89)
Therefore, we conclude (77) holds for n = t given (89) holds. Similarly, we can










t+ 1  j ): (90)
So the our aim is to show (90) holds if (89) holds. The following is the proof.




































Substituting e1 = x into (83):
Lti =
(t  1)(t  2):::(t  i+ 1)xir








t(t  1):::(t  i)(t  i+ 1)














































































t+ 1  j );
which is exactly (90) and completes the proof.















































 0:632) k  0:632n:
Proof of (c):
Pn
i=1 ci = c1 + c2 + :::+ cn
= (1  1
n
) + (1  1
n
  1








= n  fn 1
n
+ (n  1)( 1
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= n  n = 0:














































so when n increases, j cn j increases relatively faster than c1. When n = 2, c1 =j cn j








Since we have proved that when n increases, j cn j increases relatively faster than
c1, we conclude that c1 is always smaller than j cn j for n 2 [3;+1).
Proof of Proposition 12
We prove it by mathematical induction.













where pi is contestant is probability of losing and ei is contestant is e¤ort.






















where Li is contestant is expected utility. Each contestant maximizes his revenue,
in the symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium43, player 1 and player 2 will make the
43In this paper, we restrict our attention to the unique symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium
for simplicity, it remains to be investigated whether there could exist asymmetric equilibria.
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so equation (81) holds when n = 2. We can see that the bigger (a1   a2) is, the









) r  2(a1 + a2)
(a1   a2)
: (94)
So in the 2-contestant case to ensure the existence of the symmetric pure-strategy
equilibrium, r has to be in certain region (94) must hold.
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t+ 1  j : (98)
In the symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium of the t-contestant case and (t+1)-
contestant case, from any contestants point of view, say contestant 1, given that
all the other contestants are making e¤ort x, his utilities are:







U t+1 = Rt+11 a1 +R
t+1
2 a2 + :::+R
t+1




where U t and U t+1 are the expected utilities for contest 1 in t-contestant case and
(t+1) contestant case respectively. Rti and R
t+1
i are the probabilities of winning
the ith prize (ai) for contestant 1 in a t-contestant case and (t+1)-contestant case
respectively. Therefore, Rti is the probability that contestant 1 is chosen as the
loser in the (t+ 1  i)th round (which means he has not been chosen as a loser in
















(i  1)! = (t  1)(t  2):::(i+ 1)i;
P tt+1 i =
t!
(i  1)! = t(t  1):::(i+ 1)i:








ai = 1: (101)
In the t-contestant case,
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t  j ): (104)
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Therefore, we conclude (81) holds for n = t given (104) holds. Similarly, we can










t+ 1  j ): (105)
So the our aim is to show (105) holds if (104) holds. The following is the proof.










































































t+ 1  j ];
which is exactly (105) and completes the proof.
3.7 Appendix 3B
(a) In the pure-strategy equilibrium of the Power CSF model,
EUi =
eri
eri + (n  1)xr
a1 +
(n  1)xreri
[eri + (n  1)xr][eri + (n  2)xr]
a2 + :::
+
(n  1)(n  2):::(n  t)xtreri
[eri + (n  1)xr][eri + (n  2)xr]:::[eri + (n  t  1)xr]
at+1 + :::
+
(n  1)(n  2):::1 x(n 1)reri
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Hence, the expected utility is expressed as a function of . The rst and second
order conditions for a local interior maximum are the following. When  = 1, the
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To sum up, r has to be located in a certain region to ensure the existence of
the symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium, i.e., (109) and (110) both hold simulta-
neously.
(b) In the pure-strategy equilibrium of the Power CDF model, by a similar
procedure with (a), we show that to ensure the existence of the symmetric pure-




























n  t ) = AE
s > 0.
100





























[1] Akerlof, Robert and Richard Holden (2007), The Nature of Tournaments,
working paper, Sloan School of Management, MIT.
[2] Alcalde, José and Matthias Dahm (2007), All-Pay Auction Equilibria In
Contests,Working Papers. Serie AD 2007-27, Instituto Valenciano de Inves-
tigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
[3] Amann, Erwin and Wolfgang Leininger (1996), Asymmetric all-pay auctions
with incomplete information: The two-player case, Games and Economic
Behavior, 14(1), 1-18.
[4] Amegashie, J. Atsu (2006), A contest success function with a tractable noise
parameter,Public Choice, 126, 135144.
[5] Baik, Kyung Hwan (1994), E¤ort levels in contests with two asymmetric
players,Southern Economic Journal 61: 367378.
[6] Baik, Kyung Hwan (1997), Di¤erence-form contest success functions and
e¤ort levels in contests, European Journal of Political Economy, 14, 685
701.
[7] Baik, Kyung Hwan (2004), Two-Player Asymmetric Contests with Ratio-
Form Contest Success Functions,Economic Inquiry, 42, 679-689.
[8] Barut, Y., Kovenock, D. (1998), The symmetric multiple prize all-pay auc-
tion with complete information,European Journal of Political Economy, 14,
627-44.
[9] Baye, Michael R., Dan Kovenock and Casper G. de Vries (1994), The solution
to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game when R > 2: Mixed-stategy equilibra and
Mean Dissipation Rates,Public Choice, 81, 363-380.
102
[10] Baye, Michael R., Dan Kovenock and Casper G. de Vries (1996), The All-Pay
Auction with Complete Information,Economic Theory, 8(2), 291-305.
[11] Baye, Michael R., Dan Kovenock and Casper G. de Vries (1998), A general
linear model of contests,mimeo, Kelley School of Business, Indiana Univer-
sity, Bloomington.
[12] Berry, S. Keith. (1993), Rent-seeking with multiple winners,Public Choice,
77, 437-443.
[13] Blavatsky, Pavlo (2004), Contest Success Function with the Possibility of a
Draw: Axiomation,IEW Working Paper No. 208.
[14] Che, Yeon-Koo and Ian Gale (1998), Caps on political lobbying,American
Economic Review, 88, 643-651.
[15] Che, Yeon-Koo and Ian Gale (2000), Di¤erence-form contests and the ro-
bustness of all-pay auctions,Games and Economic Behavior, 30, 2243.
[16] Clark, Derek J. and Christian Riis (1996), A multi-winner nested rent-
seeking contest,Public Choice, 87, 17784.
[17] Clark, Derek J. and Christian Riis (1996 a), Competition over more than
one prize,American Economic Review, 88, 276-89.
[18] Clark, Derek J. and Christian Riis (1996 b), Contest success functions: an
extension,Economic Theory, 11, 201-104.
[19] Clark, Derek J. and Christian Riis (1996 c), Inuence and the discretionary
allocation of several prizes,European Journal of Political Economy, 14, 605-
625.
103
[20] Clark, Derek J. and Christian Riis (1996 d), On the win probability in rent-
seeking games,University of Troms0 Discussion Paper in Economics.
[21] Clark, Derek J. and Christian Riis (2000), Allocation e¢ ciency in a compet-
itive bribery game,Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 42(1),
109-24.
[22] Corchon, Luis C. (2000), On the allocative e¤ects of rent seeking,Journal
of Public Economic Theory, 2, 483-92.
[23] Corchon, Luis C. (2007), The theory of contests: a survey,Review of Eco-
nomic Design, 11(2), 69-100.
[24] Corchon, Luis C. and Matthias Dahm (2007), Foundations For Contest Suc-
cess Functions, Economics Working Papers we070401, Universidad Carlos
III, Departamento de Economía.
[25] Cornes, Richard and Roger Hartley (2005), Asymmetric contests with gen-
eral technologies,Economic Theory, 26(4), 923-946.
[26] Dasgupta, A. and K. O. Nti (1998), Designing an optimal contest,European
Journal of Political Economy, 14, 587603.
[27] Dixit, Avinash Kamalakar (1987), Strategic behavior in contests,American
Economic Review, 77, 891-8.
[28] Frank, Robert H. (1985), Choosing the Right Pond,Human Behavior and
the Quest for status, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
[29] Frank, Robert H. and Philip. J. Cook (1995), The Winner-take-all Society,
Penguin Books.
104
[30] Fu, Qiang and JingFeng Lu (2007), The Optimal Multi-Stage Contest,
Working Paper Reviews with number 843644000000000387.
[31] Garnkel, Michelle R. and Stergios Skaperdas (1996), The Political Economy
of Conict and Appropriation,Cambridge University Press.
[32] Glazer, Amihai and Hassin, Refael (1988), Optimal Contests, Economic
Inquiry, 26(1), 133-43.
[33] Green, Jerry R. and Nancy L. Stokey (1983), A Comparison of Tournaments
and Contracts,Journal of Political Economy, 91(3), 349-64.
[34] Hillman, Arye L. and Eliakim Katz. (1984), Risk-averse rent seekers and the
social cost of monopoly power,Economic Journal, 94, 104-110.
[35] Hillman, Arye L. and Dov Samet (1987), Dissipation of contestable rents by
small numbers of contenders,Public Choice, 54, 63-82.
[36] Hillman, Arye L. (1989), The political Economy of Protection,Harwood
Academic Publishers.
[37] Hillman, Arye L., and John G. Riley (1989), Politically contestable rents
and transfers,Economics and Politics, 1, 17-40.
[38] Hirshleifer, J. (1989), Conict and rent-seeking success functions: Ratio and
di¤erence models of relative success,Public Choice, 63, 101112.
[39] Huck, Ste¤en,.Kai A. Konrad and Mueller Wuller (2001), Merger and collu-
sion in contests,Journal of Institutional and Theroetical Economics, 158(4),
563-575.
[40] Konrad, Kai A. and Harris Schlesinger (1997), Risk aversion in rent-seeking
and rent-augmenting games,Economic Journal, 107, 1671-83.
105
[41] Konrad, Kai A (2007), Strategy in Contests  An Introduction. WZB-
Markets and Politics Working Paper No. SP II 2007-01.
[42] Krishna, Vijay and John Morgan (1997), An analysis of the war of attrition
and the all-pay action,Journal of Economic Theory, 72(2), 343-62.
[43] Lazear, Edward P and Sherwin Rosen (1981), Rank-Order Tournaments as
Optimum Labor Contracts,Journal of Political Economy, 89(5), 841-64.
[44] Loury, Glenn C. (1979), Market structure and innovation,Quarterly Jour-
nal of Economics, 93(3), 395-410.
[45] Michaels, R. (1988), The design of rent-seeking competitions,Public Choice,
56, 17-29.
[46] Moldovanu, Benny and Aner Sela (2001), The Optimal Allocation of Prizes
in Contest,American Economic Review, 91, 542-558.
[47] Moldovanu, Benny and Aner Sela (2006), Contest Architecture,Journal of
Economic Theory, 126(1), 70-96.
[48] Moldovanu, Benny; Aner Sela, and Xianwen Shi (2008), Carrots and Sticks:
Prizes and Punishments in Contests,April, 2008, CEPR Discussion Papers
with number 6770.
[49] Myerson, Roger B. (1981), Optimal Auction Design,Mathematics of Oper-
ations Research, 6(1), 58-73.
[50] Nitzan, S. (1994), Modelling rent-seeking contests, European Journal of
Political Economy, 10, 4160.
[51] Nti, KoO. (1997), Comparative statics of contests and rent-seeking games,
International Economic Review, 38, 43-59.
106
[52] Nti, Ko O. (1999), Rent-seeking with asymmetric valuations, Public
Choice, 98, 415-430.
[53] Nti, Ko O. (2004), Maximum e¤orts in contests with asymmetric valua-
tions,European Journal of Political Economy, 20, 1059-1066.
[54] Perez-Castrillo, J. David. and Thierry Verdier (1992), A general analysis of
rent seeking games,Public Choice, 73, 335-350.
[55] Riley, John G. and William F Samuelson (1981). Optimal Auctions,Amer-
ican Economic Review, 71(3), 381-92.
[56] Rosen, Sherwin (1986), Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments,
American Economic Review, 76(4), 701-15.
[57] Rubin, Paul H., Christopher Curran and John F. Curran (2001), Litigation
versus legislation: forum shopping by rent seekers,Public Choice, 107, 295-
310.
[58] Shaked, Moshe and George J. Shantikumar (1994), Stochastic orders and
their applications,San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 1994.
[59] Skaperdas, Stergios and Li Gan (1995), Risk aversion in contests,Economic
Journal, 105, 951-62.
[60] Skaperdas, Stergios (1996), Contest Success Functions,Economic Theory,
7, 283290.
[61] Skaperdas, Stergios and Samarth Vaidya (2007), Persuasion as a Contest,
CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Working Paper No. 070809, CESifo
GmbH.
107
[62] Stein, William E (2002), Asymmetric Rent-Seeking with More Than Two
Contestants,Public Choice, 113(3-4), 325-36.
[63] Szymanski, Stefan (2003), The Economic Design of Sporting Contests,Jour-
nal of Economic Literature, 41(4), 1137-1187.
[64] Szymanski, Stefan and Tommaso M. Valletti (2005), Incentive e¤ects of sec-
ond prizes,European Journal of Political Economy, 21, 467-481.
[65] Tullock, Gordon (1967), The welfare cost of tari¤s, monopolies, and theft,
Western Economic Journal, 5, 224-232.
[66] Tullock, Gordon (1980), E¢ cient rent seeking, In J.M. Buchanan, R.D.
Tollison, and G. Tullock, Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society, 97112.
College Station: Texas A&M University Press.
108
